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Friday, 8 February 2013

(10.00 am)

Housekeeping

THE CORONER: Yes, good morning, do sit down. Yes, could we ask the jurors to come in, please.

I'm so sorry, Mr Maxwell-Scott.

MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: Not at all. Just a couple of administrative matters --

THE CORONER: Yes.

MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: -- before the jury come in. We've had brought to court this morning by the Metropolitan Police the originals of the notes that Mr Glenny wrote at the scene --

THE CORONER: Okay.

MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: -- which are his exhibit PJG/1.

THE CORONER: Yes.

MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: We haven't had a opportunity to look at them yet properly, nor have the advocates, nor indeed most importantly has Mr Glenny, so when the time comes for him to give evidence I'll suggest that we have a short break so that he can have an opportunity to look at those documents.

THE CORONER: Okay, how long are you expecting you'll need?

MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: It may be that we can combine that with having a mid morning break.

1 THE CORONER: So if we have a slightly longer break, would
2 that help?

3 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: Yes. If we finish Mr Ford's evidence
4 earlier than a natural break, I could take the
5 opportunity to read three statements or so.

6 THE CORONER: Okay.

7 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: The other point to note is that I haven't
8 received any representations disagreeing with the
9 proposal to read the statements of Mr Coles and
10 Mr Turner, who were scheduled to give evidence next
11 week. So I will therefore remove them from the
12 timetable and add them to the list of witnesses whose
13 statements are to be read under Rule 37.

14 THE CORONER: Thank you. Is everyone content with that?
15 Yes, I see nods all round, that's very helpful. Thank
16 you very much. Good, yes thank you.

17 Good morning, Mr Ford. Do help yourself to a glass
18 of water. If you could remember to keep your voice up
19 that would be very helpful, thank you, and you are
20 giving your evidence on oath.

21 (In the presence of the Jury)

22 THE CORONER: Members of the jury, good morning. We'll
23 continue with Mr Ford's evidence initially, thank you.
24 Yes, Mr Maxwell-Scott.
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DAVID FORD (continued)

Questions by MR MAXWELL-SCOTT

MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: Good morning, Mr Ford.

A. Good morning.

Q. We'd reached the point in your evidence when your crew of four had split into two pairs, and Firefighters Hull and Stevens had escorted the occupant of flat 56 from her flat and were taking her down the stairs, and you and Firefighter Field were then going to continue up the stairs to try to find the man you'd previously seen on the balcony.

A. That's correct.

Q. As you went up the stairs, can you remember what the conditions were like in the stairwell?

A. What I remember is they were smoke-logged, but it was more of a white smoke, so it wasn't too heavy.

Q. How did you go about finding the balcony that the man was on?

A. I think by this stage we'd almost given up with the -- the numbers and floors scenario. We just worked our way up and broke every security door we could and looked.

Q. Just pausing there to show you photos of a couple of doors, so that we can understand what you're talking about. That's an example of a door that leads from the central staircase to a lobby, so not directly to

1 a balcony, but it's a door you have to get through to
2 get to a balcony.

3 A. Yeah, yeah.

4 Q. That's photograph 15. Before I ask you the question,
5 I'll then show you photograph 41. It's taken from
6 above, but that is the type of door at Lakanal House
7 that leads directly onto a balcony. If I show you then
8 photograph 37, it shows the other side of the balcony
9 door.

10 A. Yeah, that's correct.

11 Q. So having seen those photographs, does that help you to
12 remember what doors it was that you broke through?

13 A. Yeah, I remember breaking down -- well, breaking the
14 glass on several security -- the brown doors, yeah,
15 the --

16 Q. If I take you back to photograph 15, so that glass panel
17 we see --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- you broke that?

20 A. Yeah, we got it down with a back of an axe, and then you
21 can put your hand through there and open the door from
22 the other side.

23 Q. Did you attempt to open it with a key or a drop key?

24 A. I think we -- when we initially went in, we tried a drop
25 key and they didn't work, so that was the only key we

1 had on us, so from then on they had to be forced in some
2 way or another.

3 Q. I can well imagine there's a certain amount of physical
4 effort involved and use of air in having to break things
5 with an axe?

6 A. Yes, correct.

7 Q. Would it delay you by very long?

8 A. The first one, yes, but once you get the method, not
9 that long.

10 Q. Then if I show you the other type of doors, the ones
11 that lead directly to the open area and to balconies, in
12 photograph 41, how did you get through doors like that?

13 A. I think the only one we went through with that was the
14 actual landing that the people were on. I can't
15 remember, I think we just bashed on the door to get his
16 attention, and he come and opened it with the push-bar
17 on the other side. I don't think -- I think we might
18 have attempted to break it down, but I don't remember
19 breaking it down, so I can't swear exactly how it was
20 opened.

21 Q. Does it follow from what you're saying that you don't
22 think you went out onto any balconies before you got to
23 the correct one?

24 A. Yeah, that's correct.

25 Q. But you did break doors of the type we see on photograph

1 15 on more than one level before you got --

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. So if I take you back, then, to the point when you're on

4 this side of the door like this, where, as we now know,

5 the man was on the other side of it, how did you get

6 through?

7 A. I think -- I think we got his attention. As you can

8 see, there's a glass panel in the middle of the door,

9 and I think through that we could see through the smoke

10 that there was someone there. We didn't know if we was

11 on the right floor or not, but we -- we thought that

12 there was someone there, so I think we tried bashing on

13 the door to try and get his attention, and if I remember

14 rightly, he run along the landing and pushed the bar,

15 but he was very confused. I think he was unsure how to

16 do the door, but eventually he opened it.

17 Q. Did you then go onto the balcony?

18 A. No, if I remember rightly, I wedged the door open and

19 Firefighter Field went along the landing and helped him

20 with the children, and I just -- I stayed at the doorway

21 making sure it never closed.

22 Q. Were you able to see one way or another whether the

23 man's wife and children were on the balcony when you got

24 there?

25 A. No, I couldn't see.

1 Q. Was there a point in time after you found that family of
2 four when something was said about the fact that there
3 were other people still nearby?

4 A. Yes, straight away. As soon as they got out of the
5 danger, onto the landing, like, through that doorway,
6 I asked them was there anyone else in their flat,
7 probably a couple of times -- "Is there anyone else" --
8 to try and get some sort of response out of them, and
9 they kept saying, "No, no, no, but there is someone next
10 door".

11 Q. What did you do once they said that?

12 A. I got on my handheld radio and informed the entry
13 control that I had rescued two adults and two children,
14 but there also -- there was people still in the flat
15 next door, which was flat 81.

16 Q. How did you know it was flat 81?

17 A. The lady told us.

18 Q. Are you able to recall what conditions were like on the
19 balcony where you found the family?

20 A. The balcony, you mean the outside balcony.

21 Q. The outside balcony.

22 A. Yeah, it was white smoke, it wasn't dark smoke, it was
23 quite white. It was -- it was heavy, but I would
24 imagine it wouldn't have killed you, it would have just
25 been very uncomfortable out there.

1 Q. Was any area on the balcony on fire?

2 A. I never noticed anywhere on fire.

3 Q. Did you think about trying to get to flat 81 yourself

4 with Mr Field?

5 A. Yeah, at that point we said to them, "Are you okay?" and

6 they went, "Yes, yes, we are okay, we are okay", I said,

7 would you be able to go downstairs on your own and they

8 was unsure but they went "Yes". It was possible to get

9 down the stairs, it was breathable to get downstairs,

10 and I went and I turned to Firefighter Field and I said,

11 do you want to go to try and get the other family, and

12 he went "Yes", and as we turned and they sort of made

13 their way down the first couple of stairs, his whistle

14 went off, and the lady screamed. So I had to make

15 a decision then, and my decision was not to get them.

16 Q. But as you've explained to the court, up to the point

17 when Mr Field's whistle went, firstly the family was

18 willing to attempt to go down on their own --

19 A. Yes, they were.

20 Q. -- and secondly you were willing and intending to go to

21 flat 81?

22 A. We was.

23 Q. You had also told somebody over the radio that there

24 were people who needed still to be rescued from flat 81.

25 A. Yes, I did.

1 Q. When you heard Mr Field's whistle go, was there any
2 consideration to trying to get to flat 81 in any event?
3 I'm not for one moment suggesting that you should have
4 attempted it but I just want to know what you think --

5 A. No, I think -- I'm sorry, I think at that stage it would
6 have been one rule too far to go, and one step too far.
7 I'd broken a few rules at this stage, and I think that
8 that would have been a very risky and silly decision,
9 and I still stand by the decision I made.

10 Q. As I say, I'm not in any way suggesting that you should
11 have done something different when Mr Field's whistle
12 went.

13 Were there any problems or difficulties in getting
14 the family of four down the stairs?

15 A. Well, Firefighter Field went through the door -- I still
16 had the door ajar, so he's gone in front of me, and he's
17 grabbed the children, and that's the last I see of him,
18 going into the smoke. I had the lady with me, but
19 literally as they went into the smoke, she collapsed.
20 Not the greatest place to be -- to collapse, so I took
21 my BA off and put it on her, and carried her down.

22 Q. Is that something you're trained to do or was that you
23 breaking another rule --

24 A. No -- yeah, that's another rule broke, yeah.

25 Q. -- to do what you could to help people?

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. Did you pass any crews on the staircase as you made your
3 way down?

4 A. Yes, two. I heard Wayne in front of me just shouting
5 "Flat 81" and as the crew passed me I did the same, and
6 then there was a -- a second crew behind them, and we
7 done the same again.

8 Q. The woman, whom we now know to be Mrs Nuhu, was she
9 walking down the stairs unaided or did you have to carry
10 her?

11 A. At certain points -- I didn't put her on my shoulder or
12 anything like that, I just had her tucked underneath my
13 arm. I think, to give myself a rest as I was doing it
14 she was like semi sort of coherent, and she could use
15 her feet to a certain degree. On the stairs I lifted
16 her up high and I done the stairs but where I could get
17 a breath -- obviously I had no BA on, so I was taking
18 the smoke in as well as carrying her.

19 Q. So you were supporting her weight to some extent --

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. -- and you didn't have breathing apparatus.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. How difficult was that?

24 A. Very.

25 Q. But you made it out of the building successfully with

1 the whole family.

2 A. Yes, we did.

3 Q. Once out, were you asked by anybody what you had done,
4 or debriefed in any way?

5 A. Yeah, as I went out the door of the -- I think it is at
6 the bottom of the very -- of the entrance to the flats,
7 people come out, I don't know who, and took the lady off
8 of me, and they was obviously bombarding me with
9 questions, and I had to say "Give me a minute",
10 I couldn't -- I could just about breathe, let alone
11 talk. When I finally got myself together, I just
12 repeated it, I told them what I had done and what we'd
13 done and that there was people still in flat 81, and
14 then I bumped -- as I left them someone gave me a drink
15 and I then spoke to someone else and I just repeated the
16 same thing, really, "There's still people in flat 81".

17 Q. Recapping some of the evidence you were giving to the
18 court yesterday, your first instruction, as I understand
19 it, was to rescue the man in flat 81?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Then there was a second instruction about flat 56?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. In your statement dated 14 July 2009 you said this:
24 "I was asked if I had fulfilled my brief and I said
25 yes. Person and persons had been rescued off of the

1 balcony, but there were still people in flat number 81."
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. That's right, because the brief that you have told the
4 court you were given was the man on the balcony and, to
5 some extent, flat 56 --
6 A. Yeah.
7 Q. -- and you had achieved both of those tasks.
8 A. Yeah.
9 Q. The people in flat 81 had been drawn to your attention
10 whilst you were up on that balcony --
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. -- and you passed that information on.
13 A. I did.
14 Q. How long did it take to recover from all of those
15 efforts?
16 A. 10/15 minutes, just to get my breath back, get me sort
17 of -- yeah, pull myself together a bit.
18 Q. I think it's right that you were not recommitted into
19 the building, but there came a time later on when you
20 saw casualties coming out of the building.
21 A. Yeah, there was, yeah. I'm not sure how long.
22 Q. For a time, you assisted a member of the London
23 Ambulance Service to provide CPR to a baby?
24 A. Yes, correct.
25 Q. You did some chest compressions.

1 A. Yes, for 15 minutes.

2 Q. And after that the baby was taken away in an ambulance?

3 A. Yeah, we carried on doing the CPR all the way to the
4 ambulance, and it -- the baby was showing signs of life.

5 Q. I think the paramedic told you that the baby was pink.

6 A. Yes, correct.

7 Q. You eventually left the scene at about 8.15 in the
8 evening.

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. My final question is this: looking back on what you did
11 that day and the tasks that were given to you, what
12 single additional thing do you think would have most
13 helped you to carry out the tasks that fell to you?

14 A. The only thing really would be a definite number and
15 a definite floor number, that's the only thing.

16 Q. Thank you. Those are my questions, but there may be
17 questions from others.

18 THE CORONER: Thank you. Mr Hendy?

19 Questions by MR HENDY

20 MR HENDY: Mr Ford, my name's Hendy, I represent some of the
21 bereaved families.

22 Like Mr Maxwell-Scott, my clients have no criticism
23 of the way you conducted yourself that day, indeed they
24 feel you should be commended: you broke rules, you took
25 initiatives, you put the residents' health and welfare

1 before your own. On behalf of Mr Udoaka, we would thank
2 you for the efforts you made to save the life of his
3 baby.

4 I do have a couple of questions for you, though. As
5 you went up, you smashed security doors to get into the
6 lobby in order to see whether you were on the right
7 balcony. As I understand it, you went into the lobby,
8 you knew which way you should be looking along the
9 balcony and you knew which side of the building to look
10 on the balcony, so what you did was to look through that
11 small pane of glass --

12 A. Yeah, correct.

13 Q. -- to see whether the people were there and one glance
14 really was enough to realise you were too low.

15 A. Yes, correct.

16 Q. So you go up, smash the next door, look through the
17 glass.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Eventually you look through the glass and you can see
20 the Nuhu family.

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 Q. Yes. When you get to that balcony, of course you're
23 focussed absolutely on rescuing the people that you can
24 see there, and Mr Maxwell-Scott asked you whether you
25 noticed whether there was any fire, and you said you

1 never noticed anywhere that was on fire. In fact, you
2 must have gone past flat 79. Did that make any
3 impression on you? That would be the first flat that
4 you went past.

5 A. No, to be honest, no.

6 Q. No, I understand. Your original intention, having set
7 the Nuhu family on the staircase, was to go back to
8 effect a rescue of the people, including the children,
9 in flat 81. Just a couple of questions about that.
10 Presumably, in order to get to flat 81, you would have
11 retraced your footsteps onto that balcony again, yes?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. How would you have known which was flat 81; did the
14 Nuhus point it out to you?

15 A. Well, they said it was next door to their flat.

16 Q. Right.

17 A. That only leaves two options.

18 Q. Right, so you would have tried either side?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. When you went down the stairs and met other crews and
21 shouted "Flat 81, go to flat 81", or words to that
22 effect, did you expect that they would approach flat 81
23 in the way that you had, along the balcony?

24 A. I would like to think so, but I don't know.

25 Q. Obviously you're focussed on carrying this lady down the

1 stairs, I don't suppose there was much time for
2 a discussion --

3 A. No, no, that's right.

4 Q. -- on the best means of approach.

5 A. No, not at all.

6 Q. It was just to convey that number?

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. What about the floor level; were you able to communicate
9 that as well or not?

10 A. I can't remember, to be honest.

11 Q. No. When you were on that balcony and carried out that
12 rescue, were you able to tell what floor the balcony was
13 on?

14 A. No, I -- by that stage, the -- the floors were -- seemed
15 irrelevant.

16 Q. Irrelevant?

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. You were just smashing your way in to find them, not
19 counting?

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. That's very helpful, thank you, Mr Ford.

22 THE CORONER: Thank you. Ms Al Tai?

23 MS AL TAI: No, thank you.

24 MR WALSH: No, thank you, madam.

25 THE CORONER: Thank you. Members of the jury?

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Questions from THE JURY

THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Thank you, Madam Coroner, we do have two. Mr Ford, you mentioned that you sent a radio message that there were people -- more people, sorry -- to be rescued once you had the Nuhu family. Do you have confirmation -- did you get confirmation that that message got through, and if it did, do you recall who would have received it?

A. I -- I remember doing the radio message, 'cos I made a point of it. I would have been through to whoever the comms operator would have been, but I wouldn't have known who it was, I would have just got back "Received" that would have been it.

THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: So you definitely got confirmation it was received?

A. Yes, I did.

THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Okay. The other thing I was wondering was, much earlier, when you were at flat 56, yourself and Mr Field have mentioned that there was no fire actually in the corridor, it was mainly smoke, in the 8th floor corridor, the one where flat 56 was. When you were going along that corridor, you would have been passing directly below flat 65, where the fire started. I know you would have, again, been quite focussed on your task, but did you notice any heat coming from above

1 "On Friday, 3 July, I was at home in flat 85 on the
2 13th floor Lakanal House, Camberwell. At 4.30 pm
3 I received a phone call from my partner, Lyn Adams, who
4 was outside Lakanal. She told me that she was outside
5 the block and there was a fire on the 5th floor. She
6 also said police had cordoned it off and she couldn't
7 get it, she was phoning from a public phone box. I put
8 the phone down and wasn't really concerned at that
9 point, as I had experienced fires in that block before.
10 I have lived at Lakanal for about 30 years. I was
11 watching Andy Murray on the tennis and cricket on the
12 other side. At about 6.00 pm, I went out onto the
13 corridor to look for Lyn as I was concerned that the
14 lift was not working. I noticed black smoke from my
15 kitchen side, so I closed my windows and turned on my
16 room fan and went back and sat in the lounge.

17 "At about 7.55 pm, he I got a knock on the door,
18 then suddenly the door was smashed in. I saw
19 firefighters with breathing equipment. I was told I had
20 a couple of minutes to get out, then the dog went mad
21 and started to bark at the firemen. I didn't realise
22 the fire was as bad as it was, because I put the collar
23 on the dog and got my wallet and phone. I then walked
24 down the stairs with the dog, and as I was going down
25 I realised the fire was a bad one. I can't remember

1 what floor, but at one stage I remember seeing flames on
2 one of the landings. There was lots of smoke. On the
3 way down I injured my left arm somehow. I don't
4 remember how, but my arm was bleeding when I got to the
5 bottom. Once at the bottom I was seen by a paramedic
6 and they tested me for carbon monoxide poisoning. I had
7 16 written on my hand and then Lyn and I were sent to
8 the hospital. Whilst living at Lakanal there have been
9 numerous fires. Once on the 7th floor a chip pan caught
10 alight. Other ones were residents not liking each
11 other. I have experienced about six, but none as bad as
12 this one. I smoke. My last cigarette was about 6.00 pm
13 on that night. I would have about one an hour. I put
14 them out in my pub ashtray.

15 "On that day I was wearing a red Liverpool football
16 shirt, blue jeans and white trainers. My dog is
17 a German shepherd, pure black."

18 That's the end of that statement. Then he gave
19 a second statement, dated 11 February 2010, which reads
20 follows:

21 "Further to my statement dated 18 July 2009,
22 regarding the fire at Lakanal, Camberwell, on
23 3 July 2009, I was visited at my new address by
24 DC Damian Walsh of the Metropolitan Police and
25 David Kennett of the London Fire Brigade. I was asked

1 some specific questions regarding my knowledge of
2 Lakanal during the 31 years that I lived there.

3 "I moved into flat 85 Lakanal in 1978. It was a two
4 level maisonette on the 13th floor, located at the very
5 end of the corridor that was on the side of the building
6 opposite from the Marlborough public house in
7 Dalwood Street. From my bedroom windows I looked out
8 towards the town hall.

9 "During the time I resided at Lakanal, I remember
10 several fires, approximately a dozen, specifically one
11 on the 7th floor that I referred to in my first
12 statement, and one on the 1st floor during the late
13 1990s. However, prior to the fire in July 2009 I was
14 never previously asked to evacuate the building, I do
15 not recall ever being provided with fire instructions by
16 Southwark Council, although I was aware that the
17 walkways on both sides of the building were fire
18 escapes, and several years ago I was provided with a key
19 that opened the doors at the end of the walkways.

20 "I've been asked about my knowledge of the various
21 changes and alterations at Lakanal over the years.
22 Although I cannot remember specific dates, the security
23 doors in the corridors were not original features and
24 were fitted several years ago.

25 "The corridor ceilings were lowered when the new

1 central heating system was installed, which I think was
2 during the 1980s.

3 "During a major refurbishment during the mid-2000s,
4 I remember the corridor ceiling was taken down in
5 sections as the contractors moved from flat to flat."

6 That's the end of his statement.

7 THE CORONER: Thank you.

8 Witness statement of FABIAN HYLLAM (read)

9 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: If I then read the statement of
10 Fabian Hyllam, which starts at page 253 in the
11 statements bundle. Before I do so, I'll say that
12 Mr Hyllam lived at flat 75 on the 11th floor, which is
13 a west-facing flat on the south corridor of the 11th
14 floor. His statement is dated 9 July 2009 and reads as
15 follows:

16 "This statement is about a fire in Lakanal House on
17 Friday, 3 July 2009.

18 "I live at 75 Lakanal House and have done so for two
19 years. I reside with my daughter Shinelle Hyllam, who
20 was not at home during the fire. However, my younger
21 daughter, Chantelle Hyllam, aged 15, was home. Our flat
22 is on the 11th floor and is on two storeys, with the
23 bathroom and bedrooms on the lower storey and the
24 kitchen and living room on the upper storey. On the
25 upper storey there is a balcony front and back. From

1 the bedroom windows, we look down onto the front of the
2 block, which is where the access road is located.

3 "During the afternoon of 3 July 2009, I was asleep
4 in the bedroom and my daughter was upstairs watching TV.
5 There is not a clock in my bedroom, but as about 4.00 pm
6 I was awoken by the smell of burning. I got up and went
7 upstairs to see if my daughter was burning paper or
8 something similar. However, she was just sitting
9 watching TV. I then went to the door at the front and
10 opened it onto the balcony. I immediately saw thick
11 smoke that seemed to be coming from our floor.
12 I realised that it was a major fire and shut the door.
13 I quickly dressed and alerted my daughter and went
14 downstairs to the front door. I opened it and
15 immediately saw thick smoke on the landing. I shut the
16 door and tried to cover the letterbox, but smoke started
17 to come in from both top and bottom of the door. We
18 then went back upstairs and went out onto the balcony at
19 the back of the building, where we looked down onto the
20 children's garden. I could see that the Fire Brigade
21 were down there. They called up to me and I told them
22 my floor and flat number. Even on that side of the
23 building, the smoke was getting thick, and so we walked
24 along the balcony in the opposite direction from the
25 stairwell. We stayed there and waited to be rescued.

1 It took nearly three hours to be rescued by the fire
2 brigade, who led us down the stairs just after 7.00 pm.
3 It was a huge relief to get out the building.

4 "I've been asked specific questions by the police.
5 I have no knowledge of any previous fires at
6 Lakanal House. I am a smoker. My last cigarette before
7 the fire was about 1.00 pm before I went to bed, which
8 I extinguished in the ashtray in the kitchen.

9 "I'm black male about 5 foot 11 tall and medium
10 build. I was wearing a broken T-shirt and brown shorts.
11 Chantelle is a black female. She was wearing a striped
12 top and a grey jumper and possibly black jeans."

13 That's the end of his statement.

14 THE CORONER: Thank you.

15 Witness statement of CHARLES DOUGLAS (read)

16 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: I will then read the statement of
17 Charles Douglas, which starts over the page at 255.
18 Before doing so, I'll say that he lived at flat 92 on
19 the 13th floor. That's an east-facing flat, and it is
20 the flat closest to the central staircase on the south
21 corridor of the 13th floor.

22 His statement is dated 9 July 2009 and reads as
23 follows:

24 "I live at 92 Lakanal House, Sceaux Gardens,
25 Camberwell, SE5 7DP. This is on the 13th (top) floor of

1 the block. I live at the address alone, although my
2 children do stay occasionally. My flat is spread over
3 two floors. The upper floor has a kitchen and lounge.
4 From here I can see either side of the block, because
5 I have a balcony on each side. Downstairs I have two
6 bedrooms and a bathroom. My front door is on this lower
7 floor. I have lived at this address for 33 years.

8 "On Friday, 3 July 2009, I returned home between
9 3.30 pm and 4.00 pm. Everything was normal in the
10 street and I had just got into the lift up to the 13th
11 floor. As soon as I got to the upper level of my flat,
12 I smelt smoke. I went over to my balcony that overlooks
13 the shop side. It was not uncommon for the bins to have
14 been set alight. I looked downwards and saw a bright
15 red glow. It was about three floors beneath me. There
16 was no smoke, just a bright glow. It was hard to see
17 the glow and where it was coming from because the lift
18 shaft was in the way and I had to lean over the balcony.
19 I walked over to the opposite balcony on the street
20 side. When I got over there, I saw immediately large
21 amounts of arid smoke. The smoke was black and like
22 a tyre burning type of smoke. It smelt bitter.
23 I didn't need to look over my balcony to see it, as it
24 was travelling on the breeze up to me. I did look
25 downwards and saw the smoke was coming around the side

1 of the lift from the opposite side. It was a hot day
2 with the sun shining. There was a gentle breeze up on
3 my balcony and clear. It was definitely not a windy
4 day. I decided that I should leave the flat. I left
5 both balcony doors open, but all the windows were shut.
6 When I got down to the front door, I still had the smell
7 of smoke on me. I opened the door onto the corridor
8 between the flats. I saw smoke from floor to ceiling.
9 It wasn't as thick as you couldn't see through it, but
10 it was still thick. The smoke was travelling towards
11 the window at the end of the corridor. It wasn't as
12 acrid as the smoke outside. I didn't feel any heat.

13 "The woman from flat 91 was out in the corridor
14 holding her two young children, a baby and a child aged
15 approximately three years. I thought the smoke was too
16 bad to try and get out, so I told the woman to go inside
17 her flat. She did as I said and shut her door behind
18 her. I went into my own flat and shut my front door.

19 "I returned upstairs and stood on the balcony on the
20 street side. The smoke was too black and strong to
21 stand outside. I stayed inside for a bit and then got
22 a towel from a bedroom. I wrapped this over my nose and
23 mouth so I didn't breathe in the smoke. I then went out
24 onto the balcony on the street side and walked the
25 length of the balcony, which is about five flats long.

1 There is no exit route from the balcony. I did not see
2 anyone. The smoke was getting worse. At this point
3 I had not seen any Fire Brigade, but had heard sirens.

4 "I then saw the Fire Brigade arrive. The first fire
5 engine got its hoses up, but the water was clearly not
6 powerful enough. It wasn't reaching the height of what
7 I could have see was on fire.

8 "I then went to the opposite side overlooking the
9 shops. Initially there was no fire engines there.
10 I was angry that there was not enough fire engines or
11 enough power to reach the fire. I had watched the
12 firemen in disbelief for approximately 10 minutes.
13 I then stayed in the flat for about another 20 minutes.
14 During this time I was getting angry that there was not
15 enough happening to help people.

16 "After a bit of time I went out onto the two
17 balconies again. I stayed a long time on the shop side.
18 I saw a fire engine with a crane and cage with firemen
19 inside tackling the fire. This was having a good effect
20 on the fire. On the street side, the fire engines were
21 still not having much of an effect on the fire. By this
22 time, there was a large crowd and people were calling
23 for me to come down. I didn't think I could do this,
24 because it was too dangerous. I went back inside. I am
25 not sure how long I was inside for when I heard my door

1 get kicked in. I went downstairs and saw two firemen
2 wearing breathing masks. They told me to follow them.

3 "I followed the firemen and saw the corridor was
4 less smokey than earlier. In the corridor I saw some
5 neighbours. There was the couple from flat 93. They
6 are both white, late 50s to early 60s, and the lady
7 works for the council. There was also the white man
8 with the alsatian-type black dog. The two firemen then
9 led us downstairs. There was a firemen ahead of us and
10 one behind us. The stairwell was smokey but not too
11 thick and you could see where you were going.

12 "Before we went downstairs, I told the firemen about
13 my neighbour with the kids. I think they kicked the
14 door in, but couldn't find anyone. When I got to
15 bottom, I can't really remember what happened, because
16 I was so happy to see my children. I think someone
17 checked me over, but I don't know who it was. Later
18 I went onto the reception centre in Bushey Hill Road.

19 "I have no criticism for any of the firemen. They
20 were all trying their best from what I saw. I felt the
21 first engine didn't have the ability to deal with things
22 due to the height of the building. When the other
23 bigger engines turned up, things improved. In my
24 opinion, I live on the top floor and I'm still alive, so
25 I think everyone did the best they can. I did not see

1 any of the people who died during the time I was caught
2 up in this incident. From the moment I entered the flat
3 until I was rescued was between an hour and an hour and
4 a half.

5 "I'm a black Caribbean man. I am 56 years old with
6 a grey beard, black thick rimmed glasses. I am 5 foot
7 10, slim build. My hair is in dreads which are about
8 5 foot long. I wear my hair rolled around inside
9 a black knitted hat. I was wearing blue jeans and
10 a jumper with white arms and a brown body.

11 "I did not record anything on a mobile phone.
12 I have spoken to some press people but not given my
13 details out. I did not call 999 during the fire.

14 "In the time I have lived at Lakanal House, I know
15 of two fires. There was a fire about 20 years ago but
16 I don't remember which flat."

17 He refers to a second fire on the 11th floor, and on
18 that occasion no-one died but the block was evacuated:

19 "I cannot remember anything else about it. On the
20 Friday of the fire I did not have any cigarettes,
21 because although I smoke I had no money. I do not smoke
22 on the balcony or throw my butts over the side."

23 That's the end of his statement.

24 THE CORONER: Thank you.

25 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: I could read one more resident statement

1 before the break.

2 THE CORONER: Yes, please.

3 Witness statement of SHAMOLI SHAMME (read)

4 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: Shamoli Shamme, her statement starts at
5 page 272. Before I read it, I can indicate that she
6 lived at flat 49, which is on the 7th floor, west-facing
7 on the south corridor on the 7th floor. Her statement
8 is dated 9 July 2009. She says:

9 "I am the above named person and this is my
10 statement about a fire at Lakanal, Sceaux Gardens,
11 Camberwell on Friday, 3 July 2009 at about 4.00 pm.

12 "I lived at number 49 Lakanal, and live at the
13 address with my husband Mr Abdul Basith, and my two
14 children aged 3 and 2. We have lived at the address for
15 about seven months and it was our first proper home as
16 a family.

17 "The premises is situated on the 7th floor and is
18 split over two levels. On the lower floor is the front
19 door to the premises, two bedrooms and a bathroom. Both
20 bedroom windows face towards Havil Street. The upstairs
21 there is a living room and a kitchen. The kitchen faces
22 Havil Street and there is a door that leads from the
23 kitchen onto a balcony. This balcony is a fire exit and
24 is kept clear at all times. The door that leads to this
25 balcony is a fire door and you are not allowed to leave

1 this door open, although you can open it if you are
2 cooking and there is a lot of smoke. The living room
3 windows face the opposite direction towards the bin
4 area.

5 "There is a smoke alarm in good working order in the
6 hallway by the front door on the later levels by the
7 bedrooms. At no time during this incident did this fire
8 alarm sound.

9 "On this day I was in the master bedroom dressing my
10 children. After dressing the children I got dressed.
11 I went up to the kitchen to check that the cooker and
12 oven was off. I do these safety checks every day. As
13 I walked towards the kitchen window, which was open due
14 to the hot weather, I could smell smoke. I couldn't see
15 any smoke at that time. I closed the kitchen window,
16 thinking that someone was cooking something or had left
17 the oven on. I then walked out of the kitchen, closing
18 the kitchen door behind me. I went into the living room
19 and opened the balcony door which leads onto another
20 fire exit balcony. I then heard a female saying, 'Oh my
21 God, there's a fire'. I don't know where this voice
22 came from. I looked to my left, and up to the
23 9th floor, and I saw black smoke rushing out from the
24 flat directly above me, shooting straight out.
25 I immediately rushed back into my living room, closed

1 the living room door and the small living room window,
2 and then went straight downstairs to my children.
3 I grabbed my mobile and rang my nephew. There was no
4 reply on his phone. I then rang my mum's house and
5 spoke to my nephew. I was panicking now and said to my
6 nephew there was a fire in the block, come and get us.
7 I hung up and within minutes by sister, my mum and other
8 relatives were calling me. This was literally minutes
9 after I had seen the smoke bellowing out of the flat
10 above. I looked out of the bedroom window and could see
11 smoke whooshing out past the window to the left and
12 debris falling down. By now I was petrified and didn't
13 know what to do. I was very confused and didn't know
14 whether to leave the premises or stay in the house as
15 I had my children. All I could think of was if I left
16 and got halfway down and something happened I would get
17 stuck, and we would all be in danger. I am three months
18 pregnant, and was now becoming dehydrated. I was trying
19 to keep my children occupied, because I didn't want them
20 to panic. There were lots of firemen outside the lift
21 and the stairs. I spoke to them and asked what I should
22 do and I was told I was better off staying indoors as
23 the fire was on the floor above and not on my floor.
24 I closed my front door and went back into the bedroom
25 with my children.

1 "I was very restless and couldn't sit still. I kept
2 opening the front door to see what was going [it says
3 'door']. I kept asking the firemen what was going on
4 and they told me that there were firefighters on each
5 floor tackling the fire. I had no idea whether this was
6 the case or not as I was told to stay indoors.

7 "My husband and family were watching us from the
8 Havil Street side and I could see them, but at times the
9 smoke was so thick I couldn't see anything. They were
10 constantly on the phone to me, but I kept asking what
11 was happening, as I could hear the sound of debris
12 falling. At one point my child saw the smoke and asked
13 me what it was. I tried to calm him down by saying it
14 was snow and that we would go down and play with it.
15 This seemed to keep him happy, but then he asked if the
16 fire was going to get him.

17 "I kept thinking the fire is nearby as the smoke was
18 incredible. The third time I opened the front door
19 I saw a firemen taking the young Chinese boy from number
20 50 down towards the stairs. I asked him if he was
21 coming back for me as I had my two young children and
22 I was pregnant. I was told that he had to take the
23 young boy downstairs and they would come back for me.
24 I then stayed in the premises for about another
25 30 minutes waiting for the Fire Brigade to return to

1 take me and the children down. The fireman never
2 returned. I then asked my husband to pass the phone to
3 one of the firemen and I described what was happening
4 and where I was. I explained I was scared and within
5 five minutes there was a knock at the door and upon
6 opening it I saw two firemen. I told them to come in as
7 the amount of smoke coming in was unbelievable.

8 "My two year-old son saw the firemen in their
9 breathing apparatus and this really scared him. After
10 one flight of stairs I got tired and I asked to stop.
11 I went to put scarves over the children's faces again
12 and asked one of them to carry my two year-old as he was
13 become being heavy. Eventually we were led down the
14 stairs and out of the building.

15 "The exit we left was by the surgery side, where
16 I saw all my family waiting. The firemen immediately
17 took my children to the ambulance, where they were
18 treated for smoke inhalation. By now my legs were numb,
19 I was in pain and I couldn't really walk. I was then
20 laid down on a makeshift hospital bed and given oxygen.
21 They then put monitors on myself and my children to
22 check how much smoke had been taken into our lungs.
23 Eventually all three of us were placed in one ambulance
24 and taken to King's College Hospital. The children and
25 I were released from KCH just after midnight.

1 "I would describe the incident as the most
2 terrifying incident in my life. I am lucky to be alive
3 and could not get the incident out of my head. I would
4 like to add that when I was about to leave the house
5 before I saw the smoke I was going to go to the
6 9th floor to see a friend. I honestly believe that if
7 I had gone there I would be dead and so would my
8 children. The thought of this is too much to bear.

9 "From first noticing the smoke to leaving the block
10 was about 90 minutes and I cannot describe the feeling.
11 Neither I nor my husband smoke. The balconies I have
12 mentioned earlier are kept clear at all times and they
13 are for all the residents. I am British Asian, about
14 5 foot in height. I was wearing a grey and black
15 headscarf, a black dress with long sleeves, black
16 trousers and sandals. I was also wearing my glasses.

17 "I have produced a map which shows where the
18 balconies were, where I first saw the smoke and the exit
19 we left from as exhibit SS/1."

20 That's the end of her statement.

21 THE CORONER: Thank you. Is that a convenient time for
22 a break?

23 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: Yes, it is.

24 THE CORONER: Thank you very much. Members of the jury,
25 we'll have a slightly earlier break today and we'll have

1 15 minutes. This is because we're just trying to sort
2 out some documents before the next witness. So please
3 go with Mr Graham and we'll start at 11.10, thank you
4 very much.

5 (10.54 am)

6 (A short break)

7 (11.14 am)

8 THE CORONER: Yes, has everyone had a chance to have a look
9 at the notes?

10 Yes, could we have the jury in, please.

11 Mr Glenny, are you in court? Would you like to come
12 forward, thank you. Just sit down for a moment. Help
13 yourself to a glass of water. When you're giving your
14 evidence, please if you could make sure that you speak
15 up nice and loudly and clearly, and if you use the
16 microphone that will help.

17 (In the presence of the Jury)

18 PAUL GLENNY (sworn)

19 THE CORONER: Thank you, Mr Glenny, do sit down.

20 Mr Maxwell-Scott, who is standing, is going to ask
21 questions on my behalf, and then there will probably be
22 questions from others. Thank you. If you would keep
23 the microphone fairly close to you, that will help to
24 amplify your voice.

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Questions by MR MAXWELL-SCOTT

MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: Good morning, Mr Glenny, could you give the court your full name, please?

A. It's Paul John Glenny.

Q. I'm going to be asking you about your involvement in attempts to fight the fire and carry out search and rescue at Lakanal House on 3 July 2009. Back in July 2009, were you working for the London Fire Brigade?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. What position did you hold at that time?

A. Station manager.

Q. Were you a station manager based at a specific fire station?

A. No, I wasn't.

Q. So where were you based?

A. At Southwark Training Centre.

Q. How long had you held that post for?

A. Approximately 12 years.

Q. Back in 2009, how long had you worked for the London Fire Brigade?

A. 29 years.

Q. Mr Glenny, I know that you made some notes on 3 July 2009, and you exhibited them to your first witness statement, which is dated 13 August 2009. The originals of the notes are in court this morning, and it

1 would be helpful at the beginning of your evidence if we
2 could identify them and you could explain very simple
3 things about them, such as whose handwriting they're in,
4 and, as best you can, if you can recall when they were
5 written, and then we can see, for example, that they are
6 on several different sheets of paper, whereas the
7 exhibit is a single exhibit.

8 A. Yeah.

9 THE CORONER: Thank you. (Handed)

10 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: These pages can be found in the
11 advocates' bundles starting at page 174. I'll get
12 Mr Clark to pass you that as well, and I'll put it on
13 the screens. Just taking it slowly, page 174 in the
14 advocates' bundle is the covering note giving the
15 exhibit number.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. PJG/1. It describes the exhibit as "Notes made at
18 Lakanal House 3 July 2009" and the exhibit was taken by
19 DC Kersley on 13 August 2009, which was the date you
20 signed your first statement. If you turn over the page
21 to page 175, there's a page which is headed "Rescues
22 done". Some of that is quite difficult to read. Do you
23 have the original of that to hand?

24 A. Yes, I have.

25 Q. Firstly this: is that on a single sheet of paper, the

1 original?

2 A. The original, yes it is.

3 Q. So it's one loose sheet of paper, and is there
4 an explanation for why some of it on the photocopy
5 appears difficult to read?

6 A. Yes, there is. You'll appreciate the atmosphere at
7 a fire is very wet, a lot of water being sprayed around,
8 and what's obviously happened is on -- on my -- I had
9 the paper on my clipboard where I was making notes, and
10 obviously water has gotten onto it and the result is
11 a bit of a mess.

12 Q. Is all of what one sees on page 175 in your handwriting?

13 A. Yes, except the bottom section, which reads "LM08PKX".
14 That's not my handwriting and it's clearly not to do
15 with this job, because it's got an address of W2 and
16 a time of 11.45, so it must have been a bit of scrap
17 paper that I carried on writing my notes onto when it
18 already had something to do with something else.

19 Q. So up until which part of this sheet of paper do you
20 think relates to the Lakanal House fire?

21 A. My handwriting finishes where it says "Other, 2 by
22 cardiac arrest from 11th floor", and the telephone
23 number.

24 Q. So below that we should ignore?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. But above that relates to the Lakanal House fire and is
2 in your handwriting; is that right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. The apparent telephone number after the word
5 "Mayflower", that relates to something else; is that
6 right?

7 A. No, it's my handwriting.

8 Q. Right, but it's not to do with the Lakanal House fire?

9 A. I think it is to do with the Lakanal House fire.

10 Q. The word "Mayflower" at the bottom?

11 A. Pardon?

12 Q. Towards the very bottom.

13 A. Yes, on the right-hand side. The telephone number is in
14 my handwriting, but the word "Mayflower" and "Layashi"
15 is not in my handwriting.

16 Q. I just want to be clear, because I had the impression
17 that you were saying that, after the line "Other,
18 2 times cardiac arrest from 11th FL", that below that
19 had nothing to do with the Lakanal House fire, but if
20 that's not right then please say.

21 A. I beg your pardon, that line you've just read plus the
22 telephone number I think is to do with the Lakanal House
23 fire.

24 Q. Right, so where it says "CO [underlined], HP Mayflower"
25 and then a number, that's to do with Lakanal House?

1 A. No, that's not to do with Lakanal House.

2 Q. Just the number is to do with Lakanal, the 8 and then
3 743?

4 A. I think so, yes.

5 Q. Just for our benefit, what colour pen is that written in
6 on the original?

7 A. Blue.

8 Q. Is the whole sheet in blue?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Then if we look in the advocates' bundles at 176, this
11 is a sheet that's headed "Flat 81 is 11th FL".

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Do you have that in the original?

14 A. Not in the original, no.

15 Q. I think you --

16 A. Oh, sorry, I beg your pardon, yes it is.

17 Q. So if you take that sheet, is that on a single loose
18 sheet of paper?

19 A. Yes, it is.

20 Q. Is that all in your handwriting?

21 A. It is.

22 Q. What colour ink is that?

23 A. Blue.

24 Q. Then if we go to 177, this is headed "Persons removed",
25 underlined. Do you have that in the original?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Is that on a single loose sheet of paper?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Is that your handwriting?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What colour ink is that in?

7 A. Blue.

8 Q. Then if we go to 178, do you have that in the original?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Is that on a single loose sheet of paper?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Is that your handwriting?

13 A. It is.

14 Q. What colour ink is that in?

15 A. Blue.

16 Q. If you go to 179, do you have that in the original?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Is that a single loose sheet of paper?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Is that your handwriting?

21 A. It is.

22 Q. Is that also blue ink?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. I'm assuming, tell me if I'm wrong, that those last four

25 pages we looked at, 176, 177, 178 and 179, all relate to

1 the Lakanal House fire?

2 A. Yes, with the exception of the bottom of the page that
3 we discussed.

4 Q. That was on 175, actually.

5 A. Oh, I beg your pardon, sorry.

6 Q. So the four after that.

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. I'll just run through them quickly on the screen: 176,
9 177, 178 and 179 all relate to the Lakanal House fire?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. All written by you --

12 A. (The witness nodded)

13 Q. -- looks as if all written in the same pen?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Then if we look at 180, do you have the original of
16 that?

17 A. Yes, I have.

18 Q. That has -- perhaps if you just showed the members of
19 the jury, it has a fairly obvious fold in it, hasn't it?

20 A. (Indicating)

21 THE CORONER: Thank you, yes.

22 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: On the screen, I've rotated it, it's on
23 your monitor as well, Mr Glenny. So the text that's now
24 the right way up on the right hand half of the sheet, is
25 that in your handwriting?

1 A. Yes, it is.

2 Q. What colour ink is that in?

3 A. Blue ink.

4 Q. Does that look like it's the same pen as wrote the other
5 notes you've identified?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. If I rotate it again, the text which is now the right
8 way up is a series of numbers, do you see that?

9 A. I do.

10 Q. 68, 79, 82, 80, 81, and then a 50 with a question mark;
11 is that your handwriting?

12 A. No.

13 Q. What colour ink is that in?

14 A. Black.

15 Q. Is it right that on the back of that sheet of paper,
16 which we don't have a photocopy of, there is some
17 additional text?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Can you just read out for us what it says? It's very
20 short.

21 A. It says:

22 "CM Sharpe [crew Manager Sharpe], SO [don't know
23 what that means], ground floor. SM Foster,
24 [Station Manager Foster], SC bridgehead."

25 Q. Is that your handwriting?

1 A. No.

2 Q. What colour ink is that in?

3 A. Black.

4 Q. We'll probably come back to those notes later, but are
5 you able to indicate at this stage whether the parts of
6 the text that were written by you were all written at
7 the same time or were written at different points on the
8 day of 3 July?

9 A. The latter: different points on the day of the incident.

10 Q. Just looking, for example, at 176 and then comparing it
11 with 178, I'll ask you to comment, but it looks to me as
12 if they are both attempts to draw some sort of plan of
13 the floor layout of the building, but 178 is a more
14 sophisticated and detailed effort.

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. Again, comment if you will, presumably 178 would have
17 been written after 176?

18 A. I can't remember exactly, but I -- I think so, yes.

19 Q. I'll ask you to put those away for the time being. I'll
20 take you back to the events of 3 July 2009 and go
21 through them. I think your call sign was OE70 --

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. -- and that your first awareness of the fire at Lakanal
24 House is when you received a pager message around 4.40
25 in the afternoon.

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. What task were you initially expecting you might be
3 required to carry out?

4 A. Press officer.

5 Q. The task of press officer at fire grounds, was that
6 something that you had experience of doing?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. As we will see, you ended up having a much more
9 operational role. You told us that back in 2009 you'd
10 been carrying out your job for 12 years or so. To what
11 extent were you involved in attending fires for
12 operational tasks -- just to be clear, I'm meaning tasks
13 at this point other than being press officer -- in the
14 12 years or so before this fire?

15 A. Yes, all officers like me have kind of a day job, but we
16 are always available to attend fire calls. The capacity
17 in which we attend them depends on the ordering. So
18 sometimes it would be maybe as incident commander or
19 monitoring or, in this case, press officer.

20 Q. So you would have had experience of arriving at a fire
21 like this and, because you got there for example before
22 any other station manager, having to take the role of
23 incident commander?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. How often, on average, for example each month, would you

1 attend fire grounds in a operational capacity?

2 A. It's really difficult to answer that question, because
3 it's peaks and troughs, but probably a couple of times
4 a month, something like that.

5 Q. Just looking now to your initial contact with control,
6 if you can be shown the advocates' bundles, page 433,
7 which is towards the beginning of file 2. You probably
8 haven't seen this before, Mr Glenny, but as I'm sure you
9 know, telephone calls between control and officers like
10 yourself are tape-recorded. This is simply the typed up
11 version of that telephone call. It's timed at 16.40.54,
12 and if you just look at it with me, control answer and
13 say:

14 "Hello, Control."

15 Then you say:

16 "Hello, Control, Oscar Echo 70, I'm just reporting
17 that I've received the ordering to the six pump fire at
18 Camberwell and I'm on my way."

19 Then the operator at control told you this:

20 "Okay, just so you know, we're getting multiple fire
21 survival calls on that."

22 You said:

23 "Yes."

24 She said:

25 "People panic-stricken."

1 You went on to say:

2 "Yes, thank you very much."

3 Then you were shown as status 2, which I think means
4 you're on your way.

5 A. (The witness nodded)

6 Q. So we have reference not to any specific flat numbers in
7 this call, but there is a reference to multiple fire
8 survival calls. At that time, back in July 2009, what,
9 if anything, would you have understood by the phrase
10 "fire survival call"?

11 A. I'm not entirely sure. I became aware of that term
12 following this incident. I'm not sure if I fully
13 understood that at that time.

14 Q. What you're told is:

15 "We're getting multiple fire survival calls ...
16 people panic stricken."

17 As best you can, what image do you think you would
18 have formed in your own mind about what was going on in
19 relation to people in the block of flats?

20 A. I think the obvious implication would be people being
21 trapped by smoke -- feeling trapped by smoke, and of
22 course any occupants of whatever was on fire.

23 Q. Would it be right that being trapped could cover
24 a spectrum, as it were, of situations, on the one hand
25 from people who are in no real danger but have a fear

1 that they're in danger and a sense that there's smoke
2 preventing them from getting out of their flats and, at
3 the other end of the scale, people in very grave danger.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Are you able to say whether, from what you were told
6 there and your understanding of the phrases used at the
7 time, how you would have put that information on that
8 scale of people trapped?

9 A. Well, it sounds serious, the fact that control were
10 receiving these calls, and that people panic stricken is
11 quite emotive obviously, so I would have thought that
12 this sounds serious.

13 Q. Then you made your way to Lakanal House and for the
14 purposes of clarity, if I ask you to look at page 934 in
15 the advocates' bundles, which is at file 3 -- you'll be
16 passed a different one -- 934. (Handed)

17 This is very small print at the bottom, but four
18 lines up from the bottom, where I'm just marking on
19 screen in blue, do you see your call sign?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. OE70, and you're indicated as mobile at 16.41 and then
22 the reason for taking you to this, you're shown as
23 arriving at 16.57.55.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. What did you do when you arrived?

1 A. I parked -- parked my car in Havil Street, rigged in
2 fire gear and my press officer surcoat, and made my way
3 to the command unit.

4 Q. The press officer surcoat, that's something you carried
5 with you in your vehicle?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Is a surcoat the same thing as a tabard?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You made your way to the command unit. What did you
10 find when you got there?

11 A. I can't remember much about that, it was a command unit,
12 I was used to going on them. I obviously went to book
13 in with my nominal roll board. More than that I can't
14 really say.

15 Q. Do you recall to what extent it appeared to be set up
16 and operational?

17 A. I don't.

18 Q. I'm going to ask you then about your initial impression
19 of the fire when you first had the opportunity to see
20 it.

21 A. Yes, on the -- the approach from the command unit to the
22 fire, you -- I couldn't see anything, and as I turned
23 a corner and saw it, it was very dramatic. It looked
24 like -- a flat part way up the building looked
25 completely alight, an aggressive fire, and lots of

1 smoke.

2 Q. I won't ask you to turn to it at this stage, but in your
3 first statement you said this, on page 468:

4 "In my service for the London Fire Brigade I have
5 never before experienced a fire of that scale or
6 intensity. The fire spread and movement was also
7 unpredictable. I have never known of a fire that had
8 been able to jump down from the 9th floor to the 5th
9 floor before."

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. After you booked in at the command unit, where did you
12 go?

13 A. I went to find the incident commander, which
14 I understood to be Station Manager Paul Cartwright, and
15 found him on the west side of the building, pretty much
16 underneath the flat on fire.

17 Q. What discussion did you have with him?

18 A. Well, I -- I introduced myself -- we -- we know each
19 other anyway, but I said "I'm here as a press officer"
20 and he began to give me a briefing of the incident.

21 Q. Can you recall at all, three and a half years on as we
22 are now, what he said in that briefing?

23 A. Yeah, he pointed out the fire which was obvious, he said
24 that -- he saw my -- I told him that I was a press
25 officer -- sent on as press -- he saw my jacket and

1 said:

2 "I don't need a press officer at this time, I need
3 you to assist with rescues."

4 Q. By that, did you understand him to be giving you some
5 formal role?

6 A. Not so -- formal in the sense that I -- I knew what he
7 wanted, but not a formal as in "I want you to be X", if
8 you can understand that.

9 Q. I ask because we've heard about sectorisation and we've
10 heard that as this incident got bigger then, as well as
11 there being an incident commander, there was also
12 an operations commander, and there was also a sector
13 commander fire, and what I was wondering was whether you
14 understood that you were being appointed sector
15 commander rescue, or whether it was not as formal as
16 that?

17 A. No, it was not as formal as that.

18 Q. Did you wear any tabard after that? I assume you didn't
19 wear the press officer one.

20 A. That's correct, I took the press officer tabard off, and
21 if I had have been designated as a sector commander,
22 I would have needed to either go to the command unit to
23 inform them of that and receive a tabard, or one would
24 have been delivered to me, and neither of those things
25 occurred at any stage.

1 Q. Just help us then with what you would have looked like
2 and what firefighters on the fire ground would have read
3 into what you were wearing in terms of what role that
4 gave you?

5 A. Well, I was wearing ordinary fire kit, but my helmet
6 would tell them my role. Other than that, I don't --
7 they wouldn't be able to infer anything.

8 Q. The helmet would be what?

9 A. A white helmet with a broad black band.

10 Q. Does the broad black band indicate station manager?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. After Station Manager Cartwright had said that he wanted
13 you to assist with rescues, what happened next?

14 A. We were interrupted in our briefing, because there was
15 a commotion beginning at the north east end of the
16 building, and we were kind of headed that way, walking
17 that way. Shall I carry on?

18 Q. Yes, by all means, where did you go?

19 A. So we walked towards the direction of the commotion, and
20 it turned out to be that an aerial ladder platform was
21 trying to make its way round to the other side of the
22 building, the east side, but it couldn't do so because
23 of parked cars, and there was a lot of commotion as to
24 how they would -- the firefighters were going to get the
25 ALP where it needed to go, and I believe that Paul, as

1 the incident commander got involved with that, so it
2 interrupted our briefing as he went to sort that
3 situation out.

4 Q. Just pause there, and I'll put up on screen for your
5 benefit and others an aerial photograph of the scene.
6 This is photograph 3. In the middle of the picture you
7 can see a building which I am marking with the white
8 arrow, that's Lakanal House.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You told us that you started on the west side of the
11 building, directly opposite the main entrance, with
12 Station Manager Cartwright. Were you then walking --

13 A. Excuse me, did you say directly opposite the main
14 entrance?

15 Q. I did.

16 A. The main entrance was on the east side of the building,
17 as I understand it.

18 Q. There's different ways of looking at it. The staircase
19 is on the east side and the lifts are on the left side,
20 but it doesn't matter. Opposite the entrance, he was
21 lined up opposite an entrance on the west side?

22 A. I didn't think there was an entrance on the west side.

23 Q. I'll show you a photograph, just in the interests of
24 clarity. That's the entrance on the west side?

25 A. Oh, okay.

1 Q. It leads to a lift lobby?

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. It's under the central area where the central staircase
4 is. Was he lined up in line with the central staircase
5 when you met him?

6 A. When we first met? Somewhere there, yes.

7 Q. Going back, then, to the aerial photograph, am I right
8 in thinking that you walked round the north end of the
9 building --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- with him, and the attempt was to get the aerial
12 ladder platform onto the east side of the building?

13 A. Yes, the side of the building with balconies.

14 Q. They both have balconies.

15 A. Oh.

16 Q. The side where, in due course, the entry control point
17 was set up?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Did you walk all the way round to the east side?

20 A. No, we -- because of the commotion, obviously our
21 attention was taken to all this business with the cars
22 and the ensuing action of bumping cars out of the -- out
23 of the way. That took a few moments, and also my
24 attention was taken -- on that end of the building there
25 was debris coming from an upper floor. Yes, so I took

1 that in, and there were health and safety implications,
2 but fortunately that had already been dealt with,
3 because what debris was falling was falling into
4 an already cordoned off safe area.

5 Q. Did you after that return to the west side of the
6 building or did you continue on to the east side?

7 A. Continued on to the east side.

8 Q. What did you see when you got there?

9 A. A surprise, from the relative calm of the other side of
10 the building, the east side was fraught. There were
11 people on balconies in obvious distress, there were --
12 they were calling down -- down to people, firefighters
13 below and people below. There was a firefighter with
14 a loudhailer speaking back up to the people on the
15 balconies, and there were also quite a number of people
16 just watching the incident, held back, I think, at that
17 time with some traffic tape, and they were calling both
18 to people on the balconies and to us, so it was -- there
19 was a lot going on.

20 Q. Did there come a time when you saw a man on a balcony,
21 high up on the east side, tying some fabric together to
22 try to make something that looked like a rope?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. If you look in the jury bundle -- Mr Clark will provide
25 you with the jury bundle at tab 12. (Handed)

1 I'm going to ask you to turn to page 23, which has
2 a photograph on it.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So that is the man who at a point you saw on the balcony
5 with the makeshift rope?

6 A. In this photograph, I can't make out a man. I can see
7 a makeshift rope. I can just about make out a --
8 something there, somebody.

9 Q. It's difficult, I agree, but he's holding that yellow
10 makeshift rope in his arms and his wife in fact is next
11 to him, left of him in the picture?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Are you able to recall whether they were present when
14 you first got round to the east side of the building, or
15 whether you saw them a little later?

16 A. I can't be absolutely sure about that.

17 Q. Just before moving on to what you did, if you look in
18 the same jury bundle at tab 14, and photograph 19,
19 you'll see a picture of a silver car on its side, which
20 has been moved to allow an aerial ladder platform to get
21 better access to be the east side of the building.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. That photograph as it happens is taken ten minutes after
24 the photograph we just looked at of the man on the
25 balcony with the makeshift rope, but it may well be that

1 it took some time to move the car and get the aerial
2 ladder platform to manoeuvre into the correct position?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Do you recall a moment in time when Group Manager
5 Freeman replaced Station Manager Cartwright as incident
6 commander?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Do you remember how that fits into the events that we've
9 just looked at with the photographs?

10 A. Yes, it was pretty much about this time, the ALP had
11 just gained access to the east side of the building, and
12 that was about when Group Manager Freeman approached me.

13 Q. Can you help with approximately how long you'd been
14 round the east side of the building before
15 Group Manager Freeman approached you?

16 A. It's hard to be sure, perhaps ten minutes.

17 Q. So in loose terms your role for those ten minutes was
18 what you'd given by Station Manager Cartwright, which
19 was to assist in rescues?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. When you got round to the east side for the first time,
22 was there an entry control point set up?

23 A. Not as far as I remember.

24 Q. Who appeared to be in charge?

25 A. Still Station Manager Cartwright.

1 Q. Sorry, the question may not have been completely clear.
2 Station Manager Cartwright of course would have been the
3 incident commander, but who appeared to be in charge of
4 activities on the east side of the building?

5 A. I don't know.

6 Q. Did you notice any crews being committed into the
7 building in that ten minutes or so before Group Manager
8 Freeman came and spoke to you?

9 A. At some point I was aware -- I think, yeah, I think
10 I was aware of the bridgehead being set up during that
11 time, and I didn't see crews -- I don't remember seeing
12 crews being committed, but they may have been.

13 Q. Do you remember if there was anyone wearing any tabards
14 on the east side of the building to indicate specific
15 roles?

16 A. Not specifically.

17 Q. Are you able to remember whether you saw the man on the
18 balcony with the makeshift rope before Group Manager
19 Freeman spoke to you?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What steps did you take before Group Manager Freeman
22 spoke to you to assist in rescues?

23 A. We were really still coming round from the building with
24 those other things going on. I think I was distracted
25 by the -- the -- all the commotion with the cars and so

1 on. Of course, that would have been part of the rescue
2 situation, so it was quite important to -- to ensure
3 that we could get our vehicles where we needed them to
4 be, so I think that was it, really.

5 Q. When you saw the man on the balcony, did it go through
6 your mind that here is somebody who needs to be rescued?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. That being the case, what steps, if any, did you take to
9 try to facilitate his rescue?

10 A. I didn't take any steps, the reason being that I think
11 everybody there saw him, because our attention was being
12 drawn to him by the crowd and by himself, his actions,
13 and, you know, I considered that whoever was conducting
14 operations would definitely have seen that and would be
15 doing something about it.

16 Q. Who appeared to be directing operations?

17 A. I can't remember.

18 Q. Did somebody appear to be directing operations?

19 A. Again, I can't remember. I think I was taken by the
20 events, I wasn't really looking at who was actually
21 doing what.

22 Q. Can you remember anyone coming and speaking to you about
23 the desirability of rescuing him?

24 A. No.

25 Q. The court has heard evidence that some firefighters from

1 New Cross, in particular a Mr Hull, who I think you knew
2 from some years back, had a discussion with you which
3 ended in agreement that he and his crew members should
4 attempt to rescue.

5 A. Yeah, I do remember that. I remember realising that
6 there were rescues needing to be done -- I don't
7 remember specifically if it was that gentleman -- and
8 having to grab some firefighters -- everybody was
9 rushing round committed to other things -- grabbing some
10 firefighters and saying, "I need you to perhaps do some
11 rescues", and they needed to gather the requisite fire
12 equipment, firefighting equipment, and they went off to
13 do that, but they couldn't find any equipment.

14 All the equipment according to them had been removed
15 from the vehicles, probably to centralise them -- we
16 call it an equipment dump -- to centralise the equipment
17 so everybody knows where it all is and can access it,
18 and so they didn't have the necessary equipment to
19 effect any rescues.

20 Q. Just pausing there, if I just ask you to identify for
21 our benefit a couple of witness statements that you
22 made, firstly, one on 13 August 2009, which starts at
23 page 464 in the statements bundles. I've put that up on
24 the screen. Is that the first statement you made?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Then starting at page 470, there's a second statement
2 dated 12 April 2010.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You can take it from me that in your first statement,
5 six weeks or so after the incident, you didn't make any
6 mention of the attempt to rescue the man on the balcony
7 or any discussion that you had with the crew about it,
8 and you were asked about it in your second statement at
9 471. In the middle of the page, there's a question:

10 "Around this time, the bridgehead is being moved.
11 Were you aware of this?"

12 "Answer: No."

13 "Question: New Cross' crew are asked to go to the
14 building and rescue a family on a balcony, do you recall
15 this?"

16 You were shown the photograph that I have shown you
17 of him on the balcony with the yellow makeshift rope:

18 "Answer: Yes, I recall the family on the balcony
19 with sheets."

20 "Question: Do you recall speaking with New Cross?"

21 "Answer: No, not in particular."

22 Then not the next question and answer, but the one
23 after that:

24 "New Cross' crew are sent in to rescue that family,
25 do you remember this?"

1 "Answer: No, I don't remember them being sent to
2 rescue him."

3 So I don't want to stretch your memory unfairly
4 further than it can go. Do you today have any
5 recollection of being involved in talking to a crew, as
6 it happens from New Cross, as it happens including
7 Firefighter Hull, whom you knew, about rescuing the man
8 on the balcony?

9 A. The -- specifically the man on the balcony, no.

10 Q. Did you at any stage give instructions to any crews to
11 carry out specific tasks in the building?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Did you at any stage brief any crews who'd given
14 instructions by others before they went into the
15 building?

16 A. Not as far as I can remember.

17 Q. When Group Manager Freeman arrived, what did he say to
18 you?

19 A. The main thing I remember him saying to me was that he
20 wanted me to find out who had been rescued and who still
21 needed to be rescued.

22 Q. Did you then set about trying to achieve that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. How did you go about that?

25 A. Well, I could see that occupants of the building were

1 beginning to exit the building, and I realised that if
2 they exited and disappeared we would never know who they
3 were, where they came from, and we might still be
4 looking for them when they'd actually exited. So I went
5 to the main entrance exit of the building and attempted
6 to speak to the people as they exited.

7 Q. When you say the "main entrance exit" -- I'll show you
8 a photograph that will assist, photograph 6 and that
9 shows the staircase as it runs down to ground floor.

10 A. Yes, I think that's it.

11 Q. So you're talking about people coming down that
12 staircase --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- you wanted to speak to them before they disappeared?

15 A. If I can explain --

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. -- obviously everybody coming out was distressed, some
18 were injured, all of them were shocked, and some were
19 being helped by firefighters, but behind me were the
20 London Ambulance Service who immediately naturally
21 wanted to treat these people and maybe get them off to
22 hospital, whatever.

23 So I had a short window to get a word with them and
24 ask them where they'd come from, was their flat clear,
25 are they aware of anyone else nearby who needed

1 rescuing, as much information as I could get, and
2 whatever they gave me I wrote on the sheets of paper we
3 looked at earlier.

4 Q. If we look now at your witness statement, the first
5 statement at 466, the way you recalled it then, which is
6 very much what you've just told the court, was:

7 "Group Manager Freeman instructed me to find out who
8 had been rescued and who needed to be rescued. I went
9 to the east side entrance of the block ahead of the
10 bridgehead and began speaking to the people who had
11 begun coming out of the building to try and ascertain
12 where they had come from and what flats had been
13 cleared. I recorded their details on pieces of paper
14 attached to a clipboard."

15 You then say:

16 "It was quite hard trying to get coherent details
17 from people, because many of them were disorientated or
18 had sustained injuries, but the London Ambulance Service
19 were immediately taking them away and treating them
20 for."

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. At the beginning of that paragraph, you said you went to
23 the entrance at the east side block ahead of the
24 bridgehead. Is what you mean that you went as close to
25 the bottom of the stairs as you could so you could catch

1 people and talk to them before they disappeared?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Your statement then went on to say:

4 "The only person I distinctly remember speaking to
5 was a man who told me he'd come from flat 81 but had
6 been in flat 80, and there were still two adults in
7 there to be rescued."

8 We know that that would have been Mr Nuhu, who was
9 the man in the photograph on the balcony, and we also
10 know that he was still on the balcony at 1727 hours,
11 because there's a photograph of him on it, so the
12 conversation that you had with him would have had to
13 have been a little time after that.

14 A. Right.

15 Q. Your statement went on to say:

16 "When I received information of people still in
17 flats, I immediately passed it on to
18 Station Manager Guy Foster, who was in charge of the
19 bridgehead."

20 Does that refresh your memory about who was in
21 charge?

22 A. Oh, yes, at that point. I thought you were referring to
23 before -- the bridgehead was being set up, I don't
24 remember seeing Station Manager Foster in the very early
25 stages of that, although he probably was there, and just

1 to be clear, he was assisted by Watch Manager
2 Chris Payton, and so when I passed information, it was
3 either to Mr Foster directly or to Mr Payton, probably
4 more often Mr Payton, because he had a little bit more
5 time.

6 Q. As it happens, he may not have been there when you first
7 got there, depending on how quickly you got round the
8 building, because they both come from inside the
9 building, bringing the bridgehead down. Was Mr Foster
10 wearing something that indicated his role?

11 A. I believe -- best of my memory, I think he was wearing
12 a jerkin.

13 Q. Did you speak to him about how you fitted in with what
14 he was trying to do?

15 A. No, it was so fraught there wasn't time for those sorts
16 of conversations at that point.

17 Q. If that's right, then he would have been required to
18 proceed on the assumption that as sector commander fire,
19 which we believe he was, he was responsible for all
20 activities inside the building --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- both firefighting and rescue.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. When you got given flat numbers by people exiting the
25 building, what steps did you take to try to work out

1 where in the building they had come from?

2 A. Well, I immediately realised that -- the lack of being
3 able to equate the flat numbers to floors, and so
4 I started to see the need for -- well, yeah, the need
5 for plans for the building, or a layout of the building.
6 Should I go on?

7 Q. Yes, please do.

8 A. What I did about that was I thought who will know the
9 layout of the building. I immediately thought it's
10 a block of flats, there'll be a caretaker. I looked
11 around for someone, obviously you wouldn't easily
12 recognise a caretaker, but there was someone looking
13 official, he was a community warden statistic staffing
14 a traffic taped area, keeping the public back.

15 So I went over to him and I said "Can you direct me
16 to a caretaker?" He told me "There are no caretakers",
17 which was a bit surprising to me, and I said to him, "Do
18 you know the layout of this building?" He said "No,
19 I don't", but then he said, "I've got the mobile phone
20 telephone number of a Southwark council official who may
21 have access to plans of the building". So I said, "Will
22 you please ring them?" which he did.

23 Q. Did you speak to any members of the public about the
24 layout of the building?

25 A. Yes, I did.

1 Q. Was that at all successful?

2 A. No, it wasn't. I realised that anyone -- there would be
3 lots of people there that had vacated the building, not
4 necessarily in distress, but in lower floors, perhaps,
5 and I assumed they would know the layout of the
6 building, so I tried to find such people amongst the
7 crowd. To the best of my memory, I did find some
8 people, some of them English wasn't their first language
9 and it was a little difficult to understand what they
10 were telling me, but other information was quite
11 confusing. Shall I go on?

12 Q. Just pausing there, did you get any information from
13 firefighters coming out of the building?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Did you try to?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Did you consider, either yourself or delegating to
18 somebody, having a look around the ground floor area of
19 the building to see if there were any signs which gave
20 any assistance as to the layout of the building?

21 A. No, I didn't.

22 Q. Pausing there, let me show you a photograph that is
23 relevant to that point. This photograph I've already
24 shown you, photograph 5 in tab 14, which is looking from
25 the west side at the lift lobby area. If one goes into

1 that area -- and you can also access it from underneath
2 the building as well as the west side -- you come to
3 an area like this with two lift shafts and a sign above
4 them. Photograph 8 shows what that sign shows.

5 A. Mm-hmm.

6 Q. If you had seen that sign yourself, or if someone you
7 had delegated to go into the ground floor area of the
8 building had told you about it, to what extent would
9 that have assisted you?

10 A. That would have been a great help.

11 Q. We've heard evidence from several firefighters to the
12 effect that it is common for tower blocks to have
13 information like that on signs at ground floor level.
14 Can you comment on whether or not you would agree with
15 that?

16 A. My experience of flats is they're all shades of grey,
17 some have been vandalised, where there should be boards
18 there aren't, and some are well organised, so I wouldn't
19 assume anything.

20 Q. Could you look at your statement at page 468. In the
21 final paragraph, you say this:

22 "In addition, the absence of any building plans
23 until such a late stage in the development of the fire
24 certainly hampered my efforts to create a coherent
25 rescue plan. Usually, even if plans aren't immediately

1 available to a [building], we would be able to
2 physically check the layout of lower floors and draw
3 a plan by assuming they are uniform throughout."

4 Is that right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. "However, on this occasion we weren't able to do this
7 because the smoke-logging was so severe throughout all
8 the building that only BA wearers were able to enter."

9 Pausing there, what attempt, if any, was made to
10 physically check the layout of lower floors and draw
11 a plan?

12 A. From -- I didn't speak to BA wearers, so nothing from
13 me.

14 Q. Was anyone sent up, for example, to the 1st floor of the
15 building to see what they could learn from there about
16 the layout?

17 A. I don't know.

18 Q. Not by you?

19 A. Not by me.

20 Q. So this paragraph is not saying that "I tried to send
21 somebody to the 1st floor, but it was so smokey that
22 they couldn't get there"?

23 A. Sorry, could you repeat that question?

24 Q. It's not the case that an attempt was made to send
25 someone to the 1st floor, following the practice that

1 you describe in this paragraph, but that they were
2 beaten back by smokey conditions. In fact, no such
3 attempt was made?

4 A. I don't know if any attempt was made. I would assume
5 that the -- at the bridgehead where they were committing
6 crews, they would be the ones who would be taking stock
7 of where they were in relation to floors and flats, so
8 that's my understanding. Those are the people that
9 would be undertaking that kind of job.

10 Q. Where your statement says:

11 "However, on this occasion we weren't able to do
12 this because the smoke-logging was so severe throughout
13 all of the building."

14 In fact you don't know what conditions were like on
15 the 1st floor; is that right?

16 A. Well, not specifically, no.

17 Q. The notes that you have, if you could take up the
18 originals again. If you take up the one which was
19 folded in half. It's at page 180 in the advocates'
20 bundles. I think you told us earlier that the writing
21 which is now the correct way up on the screen, which
22 includes the words "Tracy Downe(?)", her name and her
23 telephone number; that was all written by you?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. I'm interested in the other numbers: 68, 79, 82, 80, 81.

1 When did you first see those numbers on that sheet of
2 paper?

3 A. I don't remember.

4 Q. Do you remember who gave you that sheet of paper?

5 A. No.

6 Q. At what stage, if at all, in your involvement in this
7 incident did any of those numbers mean anything to you?

8 A. None of the numbers really meant much to me, they were
9 just numbers. I obviously was outside of the building,
10 so --

11 Q. Do you recall looking at this sheet of paper that day?

12 A. Sorry, looking at the --

13 Q. At that sheet with those numbers written on it?

14 A. No.

15 Q. If you look in your second statement at page 473, about
16 two-thirds of the way down the page, there's a question:
17 "You mention that when you passed the information to
18 the bridgehead they appeared to already know. Do you
19 think they were aware of the urgency of some residents?"
20 "Answer: I am not sure. I believe everything was
21 taken seriously. I am not sure they would have been
22 aware of any being more urgent ones."
23 At what stage, if at all, that day did you become
24 aware of any flat numbers of greater priority for
25 rescue?

1 A. Well, certainly the gentleman from flat 80 or 81 said
2 that there were other people up there, and that was
3 impressed on me.

4 Q. So when he spoke to you when he got out of the building,
5 as you have told the court, he told you about flat 81.
6 Up until then, do you think you had any awareness that
7 there were any specific flat numbers which had
8 attributed to them by the London Fire Brigade a greater
9 degree of urgency for rescue?

10 A. No, but everything's important, so I would just assume
11 if -- certainly, if it were me, every situation is as
12 important as another, within reason, of course.

13 Q. Yes, but without unlimited resources, you have to choose
14 an order to do things, haven't you?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. You weren't aware of any specific flat numbers before
17 you spoke to Mr Nuhu that were at the top of the list
18 for rescue?

19 A. I can't remember that, no.

20 Q. I think there came a time when you did see a plan of the
21 building in a command unit, is that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Am I right in thinking that that was rather later on,
24 perhaps after 7.00 in the evening?

25 A. Yes, that's correct, and just to be clear that the

1 officers staffing that command unit, and doing that
2 function, I think told me that they had plans, I'm not
3 sure if I actually saw the plans, I probably did, but
4 I can't remember now. But clearly they had plans,
5 because they were drawing out the -- the building as
6 I had wanted to do earlier but didn't have the plans to
7 do it with.

8 Q. I'm going to show you a document to see if it is a plan
9 that you saw at that later stage in the incident. It's
10 page 13 in the advocates' bundles.

11 A. Yes, that does look familiar.

12 Q. By reference to your statement, you say there came
13 a time when you were assigned to the rescue planning
14 team at approximately 1900 hours, and you also mentioned
15 that assistant commissioner Turek told you that you were
16 joining the rescue plan team, and you then reported to
17 a second command unit and they then had plans of the
18 layout of the building. These are the plans you're
19 talking about there, I think?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. On the basis of what we've just referred to, that would
22 have been some time after 7.00 pm?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. You then continued working for the rescue planning team
25 until you were stood down at 2300 hours.

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. Let me ask you then about some features of Lakanal House
3 and whether you at some stage on the day gained
4 knowledge of them. Firstly, did there come a time when
5 you were aware that there were no central corridors on
6 the even-numbered floors?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Did there come a time when you were aware that the flats
9 were maisonettes?

10 A. Yes, but can I explain?

11 Q. Yes, please do.

12 A. When I was questioning members of the public, either
13 people from that block or associated blocks, which
14 I hoped would be similar or they'd have knowledge of the
15 block in question, they talked about maisonettes and --
16 and when asked about how they -- where they were
17 situated on floors, it was a very confused answer.

18 They said that if for instance -- they were
19 referring to maisonettes, that's the point -- if
20 a maisonette spanned the 1st and 2nd floor, that would
21 be classed as floor 1 and if they were on the 3rd and
22 4th floor that would be classed as floor 2. But then
23 other people would disagree with them, and it all got to
24 be just not credible information. So I was aware that
25 there were maisonettes, but it was very confused.

1 Q. Did there come a time when you became aware that the
2 upper floors of each flat extended the full width of the
3 building, therefore having windows on both the east side
4 and the west side?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Did there come a time when you were aware that the
7 balconies provided escape routes via the central
8 staircase to the ground floor exit of the building?

9 A. No.

10 Q. I've put up on the screen a representation of
11 Lakanal House. I accept that this is from the west side
12 of the building, whereas the view that you had for most
13 of your operational period of duty was from the east
14 side of the building, but bearing that in mind, if I now
15 put over it the flat numbers, this is when one looks
16 from the west side of the building. It will look
17 a little different from the east side because, for
18 example, flats like 80 will have three boxes on the east
19 side rather than one?

20 A. Mm-hmm.

21 Q. But the purpose of the question remains the same: did
22 there, at any point, come a time when you began to build
23 up a mental picture like that of where flats were in the
24 building?

25 A. No.

1 Q. My final question is this: looking back over your
2 involvement on the day of the fire and focussing
3 particularly on the task of assisting in rescues that
4 you were given by the incident commanders Cartwright and
5 Freeman, what single thing do you think would have most
6 helped you to carry out those tasks that that he gave
7 you?

8 A. Plans of the building.

9 Q. Thank you very much. I have no questions, but others
10 are likely to have some.

11 THE CORONER: Mr Hendy?

12 Questions by MR HENDY

13 MR HENDY: Thank you, madam.

14 Mr Glenny, my name's Hendy, I represent some of the
15 bereaved families.

16 I understand you have no recollection of sending the
17 New Cross team, including Mr Hull, up to try and rescue
18 the man on the balcony, whom we now know was Mr Nuhu and
19 his family, but Mr Hull, Mr Ford and Mr Field, in the
20 New Cross team that day, have all given evidence to the
21 jury that it was in fact you who sent them up there.

22 If you'd sent them up there, do you agree with me
23 that it would have been proper to make sure that that
24 instruction had been cleared with the incident
25 commander, Mr Freeman, and the bridgehead commander on

1 the ground floor, Mr Foster?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. The evidence that the jury has heard so far is that that
4 attempted rescue by the New Cross team wasn't cleared
5 with Mr Foster and Mr Freeman, but I gather from your
6 lack of recollection that you can't help as to why that
7 might have been?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Can I ask you about the bits of paper? I'm going to ask
10 for the jury to look at them before they ask their own
11 questions, but there are several sheets of paper, they
12 are of different kinds, some are on lined paper, one
13 sheet is blank, one has something printed on the back,
14 one sheet has an incident unrelated to Lakanal House on
15 the back, am I right about those things?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. One gets the impression looking at them that, in
18 carrying out your task with your clipboard, that you
19 were just grabbing bits of paper wherever you could in
20 order to have something to write on.

21 A. No, that's not the case. The reason why there are
22 different bits of paper is I don't like to throw away
23 pieces of paper that might still be useful, you know,
24 just green -- green stuff, and so I keep a clipboard,
25 it's always stocked with paper to write on, but it might

1 be lined, it might have something on the back of it, but
2 I can use the other side.

3 With the unrelated incident, I think what happened
4 there was I had my clipboard with me at another job,
5 I made a note at the bottom of the bit of paper, and as
6 I went through -- it was still on the clipboard and as
7 I went through, making my notes at Lakanal House, it
8 just happened that I wrote down to that piece of
9 information which was from another job.

10 Q. If we look at page 175 in our photocopies, which of
11 course don't bring out the lines on the bit of paper,
12 you've told us that there's a bit at the bottom which
13 relates to another incident.

14 A. Yes. Yes.

15 Q. The jury might well think "Here's a chap who is a bit
16 pressed to find a space to write somewhere", or maybe
17 it's the other way round, maybe the bit on the bottom
18 was added after the top bit, which was devoted to
19 Lakanal House, would that be right?

20 A. No, that is not the case at all. As I said, the bit at
21 the bottom was probably something I'd written at the
22 previous incident. It was still on -- I don't throw
23 bits away because they may be useful for the police or
24 anyone else afterwards, and it must have been as
25 I turned the page I came to a blank sheet but it had

1 a note on the bottom, ie that.

2 Q. Just help we with this: one of the sheets has a diagram
3 on the back of it. We don't have a photocopy of that
4 page because it doesn't relate to Lakanal. Is that the
5 same incident as the one that has "Mayflower", "LM08"?

6 A. I don't know if it's related to that. I was shown the
7 diagram which you refer to, and that was definitely
8 a different incident, yes.

9 Q. I don't suppose at this stage, three and a half years
10 later, you're able to tell us which page was written
11 first?

12 A. Sorry, which page -- you mean of all the notes?

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. I think it was the one -- I think it was 175.

15 Q. 175 written first. That's the one with the splash of
16 water on it?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. What about the subsequent pages, can you tell whether
19 they were subsequent or not?

20 A. It's difficult. If I went through them all one by one
21 I might be able to get some order into them, but --

22 Q. You see, if you look in 175, in the top right-hand
23 corner you have Tracy Downe there and her phone number,
24 and you've told us about that, and her phone number and
25 name also appears at page 180 as well.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So the jury may be wondering in their minds why, if you
3 were organised and working through this in a systematic
4 way, it would have been necessary to write the name and
5 the phone number twice.

6 A. I think it was systematic, I made notes as they occurred
7 and gave them to the relevant people. The fact that
8 Tracy's name is written twice, I think, is just to
9 clarify it. I can't remember why I wrote it twice,
10 actually.

11 Q. Can I take you to page 466 in your witness statement?

12 THE CORONER: Sorry, could you just wait a moment.

13 MR HENDY: Of course. (Pause)

14 Mr Glenny, just bear with me. I'd like to read with
15 you an extended passage on page 466 and then ask you
16 something about it. If we take it from the second
17 paragraph, which begins with the word "Shortly":

18 "Shortly after the ALP had got through to the
19 courtyard, General Manager Freeman arrived to take
20 control of the incident. He may have had some flat
21 numbers where people needed rescuing from, and these
22 were passed to the bridgehead that was being formed in
23 the courtyard to the east of the building. I believe
24 an officer from the command unit also may have passed
25 along some flat numbers. General Manager Freeman

1 instructed me to find out who had been rescued and who
2 needed to be rescued. I went to the east side entrance
3 of the block ahead of the bridgehead and began speaking
4 to the people who'd begun coming out of the building to
5 try and ascertain where they'd come from and what flats
6 had been cleared. I recorded the details on pieces of
7 paper attached to a clipboard. It was quite hard trying
8 to get coherent details from people, because many of
9 them were disorientated or had sustained injuries that
10 the London Ambulance Service were immediately taking
11 them away and treating them for. The only person
12 I distinctly remember speaking to was a man who told me
13 he'd come from flat 81 but had been in flat 80, and
14 there were still two adults in there to be rescued.
15 When I received information of people still in flats,
16 I immediately passed it on to Station Manager
17 Guy Foster, who was in charge of the bridgehead. On
18 most occasions he was already aware of these people
19 because they had already contacted our control. There
20 appeared to be a large information overlap."

21 One gets the impression from that, Mr Glenny, that
22 your source of information were the residents of the
23 block coming down and passing you as you stood towards
24 the bottom of the stairs; would I be right about that?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So it wasn't part of your activities to ascertain from
2 control who was reporting needing rescue?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Well, that may explain why it is that in the documents
5 that the jury will look at in a moment in the original,
6 what we see is an attempt at a list, really, of those
7 who had been rescued rather than a list of those who
8 need rescuing; is that fair?

9 A. No, it's not fair. Basically, I recorded the
10 information I was given, so the people that were
11 exiting, I noted who they were, where they came from,
12 whatever they told me I noted it down, and whenever
13 I became aware that there were people still to be
14 rescued, I noted that down. The difference in that list
15 is as it was.

16 Q. I follow. Because the only mention, for example, of
17 flat 79, where we know there was somebody who required
18 rescue, is at the top of page 179, where flat 79 is
19 being recorded as being on the 9th floor. Now, that
20 information couldn't have come from a resident, because
21 nobody in flat 79 had come down. Do you recollect how
22 you would have -- how that --

23 A. No, I don't.

24 Q. The only reference I think -- I'll be corrected if
25 I have it wrong -- to flat 81, unless it's one of the

1 ones that's been damaged by water on page 175, which it
2 may well be, but the only other specific reference to
3 flat 81 is at the top of page 176, which records that
4 flat 81 is on the 11th floor.

5 A. There's reference -- there's reference to flat 80 on
6 the -- the piece of paper entailed "Rescues done".

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. It is under the water damage, but it's definitely there.

9 Q. Yes, I see that in fact. Thanks for that, Mr Glenny.
10 If you look down to the sixth entry, it's 80, but
11 "[something] recovered" --

12 A. "... rescued from flat 81".

13 Q. "... rescued from flat 81, one man, two girls."
14 Then there's reference below that to flats beginning
15 with an 8, and it may be that the last one indeed is 81,
16 does that look -- you have the photocopy there?

17 A. The line underneath says:
18 "80, two adults still to rescue."
19 But it has a query against it, so maybe there was
20 an element of doubt about it.

21 Q. Just go down to the last one above the underlined
22 heading. Does that say 81, something or other?

23 A. I can't be sure, I'm sorry.

24 Q. I take it that you assumed that brigade control would be
25 passing on the information it was receiving direct from

1 residents, passing that on to Mr Freeman and Mr Foster
2 by whatever channels they'd set up?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. The next matter I wanted to ask you about was this: at
5 page 468 of your witness statement, in the penultimate
6 paragraph there's a passage that Mr Maxwell-Scott read
7 to you, but he didn't read the last sentence, which is
8 the one that I wanted to ask you about. In the last
9 sentence of the penultimate paragraph on 468, you say:

10 "The parked cars in the access road prevented us
11 from siting our appliances where they needed to be."

12 Could you look at some photographs with me. We want
13 divider 14 at page 6A.

14 THE CORONER: That's in the jury bundle.

15 MR HENDY: In the jury bundle, madam.

16 This is at a stage where there were two appliances
17 in the foreground there, but that road at the side of
18 Lakanal House, on the west side, is the access road to
19 which you were referring.

20 A. Sorry, I'm not sure I'm in the right place.

21 Q. I'm sorry, it's divider 14 of the jury bundle, and
22 page 6A.

23 A. Number 16, yes?

24 Q. 6A.

25 A. I beg your pardon.

1 Q. That's the one. The photographer, Mr Udi, is looking
2 east here, you can see the north end of Lakanal House,
3 and what I'm asking you is whether the access road that
4 you were mentioning is the one with the appliance in it.

5 A. I'm not entirely sure, I can't remember the -- the road
6 layout very well at this point, sorry.

7 Q. Okay. Let's see if another photograph helps. Go in
8 that same tab to 17. That's looking along the access
9 road of Lakanal House and we're now looking in the other
10 direction, to the north, and the appliance that we'd
11 seen earlier has been withdrawn from the access road.
12 Does that help you locate the access road? There also
13 we can see the parked cars, and I wonder whether they're
14 the parked cars which you felt prevented you from siting
15 your appliances where they needed to be.

16 A. No, to the best of my memory, the parked cars which were
17 infringing were on the north end of the building, going
18 round to the east, so the bottom of that picture and
19 turning to the right as you look at the picture, is my
20 recollection.

21 Q. Well, let me just try one more photograph, and that's
22 photograph 18, which is the same access road, which is
23 much later in the day, when the Greenwich ALP has been
24 positioned, and you can see that the Greenwich ALP has
25 its extended legs out, but it can't go further than the

1 first parked car because of the width of the extension
2 of the legs.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Is that not the obstruction from the parked cars in the
5 access road to which you were referring at page 468 in
6 your witness statement?

7 A. To the best of my memory, the parked cars were not in
8 this area, they were at the end of the building, that's
9 how I remember it.

10 Q. Okay. The next matter I wanted to ask you about was
11 this: Mr Maxwell-Scott asked you about this on page 468
12 in the last paragraph, where you described the practice
13 of sending somebody to check the layout of lower floors
14 and draw a plan by assuming that the layout is uniform
15 throughout. You say that you didn't in fact send
16 anybody, and the question that may be in the jury's mind
17 is: why on earth not?

18 A. I think the simple answer is I was a bit task focussed
19 on the -- I was expecting to find plans or the layout of
20 the building from a caretaker that didn't exist, from
21 residents that -- I would have assumed anyone who lived
22 in the block would have an understanding of how it was
23 configured, and that didn't seem to be the case either,
24 and latterly, it hasn't come up in the questions asked,
25 but the long gap between finding out that there was

1 a council official present on site who had access to
2 plans, we made three phone calls --

3 Q. I'm going to ask you about that, Mr Glenny, don't worry,
4 we're going to cover that before I sit down. As
5 I understand you, it was in your mind that somebody
6 would have a plan, of course.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. But nonetheless you're tasked by Mr Freeman to collect
9 information on those rescued and those needing to be
10 rescued; you need to know where those flats are, don't
11 you?

12 A. Yes, absolutely, yeah.

13 Q. Mr Maxwell-Scott also asked you about the sign board at
14 the base of the flats showing the floor numbers and the
15 flats on each floor, and you said "Well, in some of the
16 blocks those boards have been vandalised and in some
17 not, so you couldn't make an assumption that there was
18 such a board", but again it may be in the jury's mind to
19 ask, "Well, why not send someone to see whether there
20 was such a board and it was readable"?

21 A. It obviously didn't occur to me to do that.

22 Q. Can I ask, on a fire ground, do firefighters carry --
23 going back three and a half years, did they then carry
24 mobile phones with them?

25 A. Only if they had their private phone, not -- not brigade

1 issue.

2 Q. You, for example, would you have had a mobile phone with
3 you --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- capable of taking photographs?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Let's ask about that final matter that you raise.

8 I think we can just step back to 467. In 467 you refer
9 to the discussion that you had had with the community
10 warden, and the community warden said that he had the
11 number of the relevant Southwark Council officer, and
12 you asked him to phone up that person and he did, and
13 what did he say that was the result of that call?

14 A. I asked him to transmit the urgency of -- the necessity
15 for plans of the building, so could she come to -- to
16 where we were, and if possible bring the plans, and he
17 said to me that she'd said she could and would.

18 Q. If we pick it up at the bottom of 467, you say:

19 "I had become increasingly frustrated by the lack of
20 the building plans. I tried calling the Southwark
21 Council officer on several occasions but on each
22 occasion her phone was engaged."

23 Is that right?

24 A. That's correct, and if -- if I may add, this was after
25 I'd met her face to face eventually and we'd agreed --

1 we'd exchanged mobile numbers, because I didn't want her
2 to escape, if you see what I mean. So I gave her my
3 number, I got her number I agreed, "Please, get the
4 plans" which she said she could obtain from the council
5 offices at the end of the road and I said "We'll meet
6 back here at the CU as soon as possible", and she agreed
7 to that.

8 Q. You explained how you met her at page 474, and we can
9 read from the second paragraph there, in which you say:

10 "I was also frustrated that we didn't have the
11 official, Tracy Downe, from Southwark Council arrive for
12 a long time. The community warden had spoken to her
13 several times. I later found that she was at a silver
14 meeting --"

15 That's a meeting of the chiefs various services:

16 "-- which I went to and I told her the information
17 I needed. I told her I needed the plans which she said
18 were in a office at the end of the road. We exchanged
19 contact details and she said she would contact me with
20 the information. She never got back to me, but I later
21 found she had provided the plans [to the command unit]."

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. Was it only by chance that you found that the plans were
24 in the command unit?

25 A. Yeah, to the best of my memory, it was when I was

1 changed over to be part of the rescue plan team that
2 they had plans, so I assume that must be the plans that
3 she brought.

4 Q. Yes. The telephone number that you took from her, that
5 was the number on the papers that we looked at earlier,
6 recorded twice?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Yes, thank you very much, Mr Glenny. Madam, I would be
9 grateful if the jury could look at the actual documents
10 and maybe they have some questions.

11 THE CORONER: Yes, I'll deal with that after others have
12 asked questions, thank you.

13 Mr Dowden?

14 Questions by MR DOWDEN

15 MR DOWDEN: Yes, good afternoon, my name's Dowden, I act on
16 behalf of one of the bereaved.

17 I don't have a clipboard with me, but would I be
18 right to assume that possibly a similar size to this A4
19 folder --

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. -- clip on the top --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- and what you would do is you would put pieces of
24 paper on there and you'd hold it up in this fashion, and
25 you'd start writing on it.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. I just want to ask you a couple of questions about the
3 note with the numbers on it. That's page 180, the one
4 with 68, 79, 82, 80, 81 and 50 with the question mark.
5 Do you have that?

6 A. Sorry, I think it's coming up on the screen.

7 Q. Yes, it's on the screen now. We know, and the jury will
8 see later, that that is a folded piece of paper. Do you
9 recall whether that was folded when it got to you?

10 A. I don't think it did get to me. My understanding is --
11 I don't remember seeing those numbers -- my
12 understanding is that they didn't -- that those numbers
13 weren't there on my notes, so they appeared -- must have
14 appeared afterwards, I presume.

15 Q. Well, let's look at it a different way. You say that
16 the writing at the bottom of the screen -- we don't need
17 it to be put up the right way -- but that's your writing
18 at the bottom?

19 A. Yes, it is.

20 Q. If this is a folded piece of paper and you've made those
21 notes, did you make those notes when you were there?

22 A. Yes, I did.

23 Q. Given that you're at the scene of a fire and you've got
24 a clipboard, you're likely to use that, aren't you, when
25 you're making those notes?

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. It's likely, isn't it, that you would have clipped that
3 piece of paper on the top of the clipboard, and what you
4 would have is the notes on the front side, yet
5 underneath flat numbers which you wouldn't see?

6 A. It's supposition. I don't remember writing on a folded
7 piece of paper. I may have done, but I don't remember
8 it, and that isn't -- those aren't -- that isn't my
9 handwriting, and I don't know how those numbers got
10 there.

11 Q. Thank you?

12 THE CORONER: Thank you. Ms Al Tai?

13 Questions by MS AL TAI

14 MS AL TAI: Good afternoon, Mr Glenny. I act on behalf of
15 one of the bereaved.

16 Can I ask you, please, to look at one of your notes
17 again, it's on 179, and it's the note, you've been taken
18 to it earlier, it's the note where at the top on the
19 upper right hand corner -- can you hear me okay?

20 A. Yes, I can, yeah.

21 Q. It says:

22 "Flat 79 on the 9th floor."

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Can I take you as well to your statement, please,
25 Mr Glenny. Can you look at page 465 of your statement,

1 please. I'm looking at the third paragraph. You state,
2 if you don't mind, if you let me read, you say here:

3 "As Lakanal House came in view, I could see it was
4 a large high rise block of flats. There was a serious
5 fire visible on its west side. The fire appeared to
6 have entirely engulfed a 9th floor flat."

7 You then go on to say:

8 "The external wall of this floor was completely
9 alighted."

10 At that time you thought there was a fire on the 9th
11 floor. Were you aware at the time that you received
12 a call out that the origin of the fire was on the
13 9th floor?

14 A. No.

15 Q. You weren't aware that the origin of the fire was on the
16 9th floor then at all?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Didn't we hear earlier though that you had listened to
19 radio communications in which you were listening
20 repeatedly to a fire that had broken out in
21 Lakanal House?

22 A. Sorry, when you say "repeatedly" --

23 Q. If I take you to your statement, it might assist. One
24 moment, Mr Glenny. It's at page 464 of your statement,
25 please, it's the third paragraph down, in which you

1 state:

2 "At that time I hadn't been tasked to attend the
3 fire in person, but monitored it remotely by listening
4 to the radio communications at our listening point at
5 the training centre. I heard that people inside the
6 building had been calling our control to say that they
7 were trapped."

8 Are you telling me that you weren't aware at that
9 point that the fire was on the 9th floor?

10 A. Yes, I am saying that.

11 Q. Is it possible, Mr Glenny, that you confused flat 79
12 with the flat where the origin of the fire was?

13 A. The question never arose in my mind.

14 Q. Never at all?

15 A. Well, not at that point.

16 Q. The reason I ask is because I'm trying to understand why
17 you put the 9th floor and attributed it to flat 79.

18 A. I see. All I can say is, and I don't remember writing
19 that specifically, but as information became clearer
20 I would write it in so that it would be known and
21 remembered later. So I mean, that -- that note about
22 that flat on that floor would have been written in quite
23 some time during the incident.

24 Q. I understand that, I'm just trying to understand why
25 specifically you put that flat number with that floor

1 number of, but you can't assist me?

2 A. I was either told -- I don't know, I was either told it
3 or got the information from wherever.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr Glenny.

5 THE CORONER: Mr Matthews?

6 Questions by MR MATTHEWS

7 MR MATTHEWS: Mr Glenny, my name's Matthews, I ask questions
8 on behalf of the London Borough of Southwark. Can I get
9 your help first with "silver command", and just in
10 a line or two, what is "silver command"?

11 A. It's basically incident command, it's the -- it's the
12 command of the incident, and -- yeah, so the silver
13 incident commander is the overall person in charge of
14 that fire.

15 Q. When was silver command set up in this incident?

16 A. I don't know, because I wasn't anywhere near the command
17 unit where -- where it would have been originated.

18 Q. Your understanding, then, from your time, as it were, in
19 the job, local authority liaison officers and other
20 agencies, the procedures are for them to report to
21 silver command?

22 A. Sorry, just to -- just to be clear, anybody coming onto
23 an incident of this nature should report to the command
24 unit.

25 Q. Right. During your time and your involvement, did you

1 have any knowledge of what was coming out of the command
2 unit in terms of requests and instructions?

3 A. There was radio traffic, I had a handheld radio attached
4 to my tunic. I obviously spoke to various people in the
5 course of being there, I can't remember the specifics of
6 any of that, and of course the different incident
7 commanders, Mr Cartwright, Mr Freeman, would have no
8 doubt told me stuff. So from that point of view, yes;
9 specifically from the command unit, no.

10 Q. Can I get your help, then, in putting some timings or
11 approximate timings on the requests that you told us
12 about. Can I ask you that you have a look at your
13 statement that we have at page 466. I'm looking
14 two-thirds of the way down, and you're dealing here in
15 the statement in terms of narrative, you describe:

16 "The only person I distinctly remember speaking to
17 was a man who told me he'd come from flat 81 but had
18 been in flat 80, and there were still two adults in
19 there to be rescued."

20 That's the period of time we're talking about. If
21 you could look over the page, it's then that you deal
22 with having a conversation about finding whether there
23 was a caretaker and getting this phone number of someone
24 from the Southwark Council, a Southwark Council officer
25 who was at the scene --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- so it's after your conversation with somebody who had
3 come out of what you understood was flat 81.

4 A. Yeah, the reason is that I realised that what I was
5 getting -- when I said to people, "Where have you come
6 from?" they were telling me their flat numbers, and it
7 didn't equate to the floor numbers.

8 Q. I quite understand, it's just for the timing. I'm not
9 being rude, you have told us that. It comes after
10 somebody has spoken to you who's come from flat 81?

11 A. As best I can remember, yes.

12 Q. Can I then ask that you have a look at page 473, which
13 is the question and answer statement that's taken from
14 you, I think, on 12 April 2010. At the very bottom of
15 473, you've just been asked questions about this
16 occupant of flat 80, and you're then asked this
17 question:

18 "There was confusion regarding the layout. There
19 were local crews who were familiar with the building.
20 Would you have expected the information they had about
21 the building to be available to you?"

22 "Answer: In the first instance, I would expect
23 local knowledge to be used by the incident commander and
24 the bridgehead. In a smaller kind of job, I would have
25 had more contact with crews, but this job was so big and

1 crews had specific tasks, so I didn't have much
2 interaction with them. I was expecting to get
3 information from a caretaker or the residents
4 themselves."

5 The question I have, then, looking at that answer,
6 at the time, did you expect that local crews would have
7 passed on their information to the bridgehead?

8 A. Yes, if they -- if they had specific knowledge of the
9 building, I would have expected them to report it to
10 probably the officer in -- well, their officer in charge
11 and for it to make its way back to incident -- the
12 incident commander.

13 Q. So what you were requesting at this later stage was
14 something for the wider operation?

15 A. What I was requesting?

16 Q. You've described requesting building plans.

17 A. Okay, just to be clear, it was evident that we needed
18 plans to equate the -- the floor levels to the flat
19 numbers, so I was desperate to get plans from wherever.
20 That was what I was after.

21 Q. What information did you think they had at the
22 bridgehead?

23 A. I -- I assumed that they would have gathered information
24 from crews that had already gone up and come down,
25 because every crew is debriefed when it exits to gain

1 relevant information from what we've encountered during
2 the incident. So I would have assumed that they'd built
3 of some knowledge of whatever was required.

4 Q. Can I just then lastly take you on to the next part of
5 your answer at 474. It's here you say:

6 "I was also frustrated that we did not have the
7 official, Tracy Downe of Southwark Council arrive for
8 a long time. The community warden had spoken with her
9 several times."

10 Then you say this:

11 "I later found she was at a silver meeting which
12 I went to and told her the information I needed."

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So when you meet her face to face, that's when she's
15 attending a silver command meeting?

16 A. I waited until the meeting had ended, once that
17 concluded I spoke to her.

18 Q. Exactly. What I'm asking about though is for you to
19 help us with timings. When you speak to her is when
20 there'd been a concluded silver command meeting?

21 A. Yes, you have to realise that over three phonecalls,
22 according to the person who was next to me making the
23 calls, she said she would attend every time we rang, but
24 didn't.

25 Q. Thank you.

1 THE CORONER: Yes. Mr Compton, I don't know whether

2 Mr Walsh is likely to come on with many questions.

3 I'm just looking at the time, because it would be
4 quite nice if we could finish with Mr Glenny and then
5 have a lunch break, but if you have questions which are
6 going to last some time we'll have a break.

7 MR WALSH: I'm not planning to ask any questions at the
8 moment, subject to Mr Compton's questions.

9 THE CORONER: Thank you. Mr Compton?

10 Questions by MR COMPTON

11 MR COMPTON: Madam, if you and the jury can bear with me
12 I just have one matter to ask.

13 Ben Compton, I'm acting for Apollo Property
14 Services. Can I ask you to go to tab 15 of the jury
15 bundle, please, at page 1152.

16 A. Was that 152?

17 Q. 1152. If we go through this we have "Operational
18 News" --

19 THE CORONER: Mr Glenny's just getting there.

20 A. I'm a bit confused. (Pause)

21 MR COMPTON: You're being taken blind to this, but the jury
22 have been taken through it, and this is one of the
23 training documents, and the one point I wanted to take
24 you through was gathering information on this page.
25 This was relevant at the time of the fire. If you look

1 at "Gathering information"; do you have that particular
2 paragraph, about halfway down?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. "The incident commander should remain at ground floor
5 level and start the information gathering process of the
6 decision making model. It is important that the
7 incident commander establishes as early as possible
8 floor or floors involved and inform the bridgehead crew
9 before involved."

10 That is, they go aloft.

11 I'm not going to ask you about familiarisation
12 visits and section 72Ds and so on, that's for others,
13 but I just want to ask you this: in fact, if you're
14 going to ask for plans and the layout of a building,
15 it's sensible to do that, the first incident commander
16 when he takes over, would you agree with that?

17 A. When I took over, I didn't immediately see the need for
18 a plan. That might sound a bit silly, but it was only
19 when getting information from the people exiting the
20 building and all the flat numbers, I realised I had to
21 equate flat numbers to floor levels, and I couldn't do
22 that. That's when I thought that "What I need is
23 a plan", it was obvious then.

24 Q. I understand that entirely from your point, but just
25 going back, if we look at the basic rule book, it is

1 that incident commanders shouldn't actually send
2 firefighters to a bridgehead before having -- my
3 words -- sufficient information on the layout of the
4 building; would you agree with that?

5 A. No, I wouldn't agree with that, because sometimes that
6 information just may not be available, and you can't
7 just stand by and let everything go on without doing
8 something about it, so a bridgehead and BA teams and
9 everything would go ahead with as much information as
10 they could possibly get, or none.

11 Q. But if you're going to do that, you must have a system,
12 surely, of gathering information about the layout of the
13 building --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- so that there's a chain, a linkage back to the
16 incident commander, so that he knows which floors, the
17 layout and so on, and where the fires are; would you
18 agree with that?

19 A. Ideally, there would be information that's pre-known by
20 the local crews, assuming they attend the incident, and
21 that information should be conveyed to the incident
22 commander and he makes his decisions or her decisions
23 based on what he or she knows.

24 Q. Yes. Well, I'm not going to take it any further than
25 that, I think that's enough. Thank you, madam?

1 THE CORONER: Mr Walsh?

2 MR WALSH: No, thank you, madam.

3 THE CORONER: Mr Clark, I wonder, please, whether you'll
4 just bring over the notes which Mr Glenny made, thank
5 you. I'll just have a quick look and then give them to
6 the jury. (Pause)

7 Thank you, could I ask the jury to have a look at
8 them. Members of the jury, they're coming over to you.

9 MR HENDY: Madam, might I suggest that the jury might want
10 to look at them over lunch and give each of them the
11 chance to see the whole group of papers altogether?
12 I don't want to hold things up, but it's just
13 a suggestion.

14 THE CORONER: All right, that sounds like a sensible
15 suggestion, so yes, all right, let's deal with it that
16 way.

17 Members of the jury, if you take the notes with you
18 into the jury room, then please bring them back after
19 lunch. We'll continue at 2.15, then. Thank you very
20 much.

21 Mr Glenny, are you all right to stay until 2.15? We
22 will finish your evidence after that. Because you're
23 still giving your evidence, you must not talk to anyone
24 about your evidence or indeed about the matter. Could
25 you please be back at 2.15?

1 A. Yes, madam.

2 (1.14 pm)

3 (The short adjournment)

4 (2.14 pm)

5 THE CORONER: Yes, could we have the jury back in, please?

6 (In the presence of the Jury)

7 THE CORONER: Yes thank you, members of the jury, do you
8 have Mr Glenny's notes?

9 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: I believe Mr Graham has them.

10 THE CORONER: Oh, right. Could I just have them for
11 a moment? Members of the jury, do you have any
12 questions for Mr Glenny?

13 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Thank you, Madam Coroner, we do
14 have about six, I believe.

15 I'll try and put them in some logical order, but
16 please let me know if I'm confusing. You were saying
17 that you were taking note of quite a large amount of
18 data coming in from all directions, we understand that,
19 and that you were passing on particularly important flat
20 numbers, I guess you might say, that required rescue,
21 also that there was a lot of duplication of information.

22 We were just wondering if you could clarify whether
23 you were passing on raw data, for want of a better term,
24 or whether you were filtering it in some way and just
25 sort of going, "Well, I had flat 79 five times now,

1 I don't need to report that for a fourth time"?

2 A. I think what you -- I think I understand what you're
3 asking me. I passed on all the information I got,
4 whether it was about people that had been rescued or the
5 flat was empty, or people needed rescuing. I think
6 where you might see duplication is where at a later date
7 I've probably tried to collate the notes I've made and
8 see -- you know, get them in some relevant order, so
9 that probably explains the repetition.

10 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Okay, thank you.

11 We do have a number of questions in regards to the
12 papers that Mr Hendy suggested we look at, but first
13 something that we wanted to pinpoint. In the evidence
14 you've given earlier, you have mentioned that you don't
15 have a clear recollection of speaking to the -- I think
16 it was the New Cross crew before they entered the
17 building, yet we've heard from the evidence of that crew
18 that due to the lack of an entry board, an entry control
19 board, they didn't have anywhere to put their tallies so
20 they gave them to you. Do you recall having them?

21 A. No, that's not the case at all. I never received any
22 tallies and I wouldn't accept them, because that's not
23 the way the procedure works.

24 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Even if there wasn't an entry
25 control board?

1 A. Yeah, even if there wasn't.

2 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: So following from that, if that
3 crew -- and I think it was Mr Hull, Mr Field and
4 Mr Ford -- were to try and give you their tallies, what
5 would you suggest that they --

6 A. I wouldn't accept them, they have to go in an entry
7 control board and the wearers have to be processed on
8 that board.

9 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: So if there's not an entry control
10 point, nobody can go into the building?

11 A. Well, people obviously can do anything they want to do,
12 but the procedure is that they must book in at the entry
13 control point.

14 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Right, okay.

15 THE CORONER: But you have no direct knowledge whether they
16 handed their tallies to someone else or not?

17 A. No.

18 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: As I said, we do have a few
19 questions in regard to the notes that you made. Okay,
20 the first that we wanted to ask, we've had a look at the
21 sheet of paper that's I think headed "Rescues done", or
22 something to that effect, the one that's most water
23 damaged.

24 THE CORONER: If you want, it's page 175.

25 A. Thank you.

1 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: We've heard from yourself how the
2 majority of the notes on all the pieces of paper are
3 yours, and yet there are a few that aren't in your
4 handwriting, and are therefore in a different coloured
5 pen. We've noticed, though, that it would appear to us,
6 and I realise it's significantly water damaged, that the
7 entry of 81 at the bottom of that list is actually in
8 a black pen, similar to the writing that's not yours,
9 you say.

10 A. Sorry, I didn't quite catch the bit before "in the black
11 pen".

12 THE CORONER: Can I just stop you a moment. Mr Clark, could
13 I just ask you to hand this to Mr Glenny, because
14 I think it will be easier if he can see it.

15 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: I'm sorry, I thought he had the
16 originals. Sorry, it's not at all clear on the screen.

17 THE CORONER: That's all right. (Handed)

18 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Okay, so have a look at that. For
19 the vast majority of writing it's in blue pen.
20 Unfortunately, as I said it's in one of the worst
21 damaged parts. At the bottom of the list we see number:
22 "81 --"
23 I'm afraid I can't read on our screen what that
24 says, but that appears to us to have been in a different
25 coloured pen: black?

1 A. I see what you're referring to, but it's -- possibly
2 it's so badly damaged, it's really difficult to tell.

3 THE CORONER: Certainly, on the face of it, it looks
4 a different colour, doesn't it?

5 A. Yes.

6 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Okay, thank you. From evidence --
7 and this may be something that you can't actually
8 answer, I do realise -- from evidence that we've heard
9 much earlier, it sounds as though another firefighter
10 had a list of numbers of particularly important flats,
11 I guess you could say, and he recalls perhaps having
12 that list and putting it in his pocket, but he doesn't
13 recall pulling it out and doing something he -- I think
14 he said at the time that it was in the pocket with his
15 gloves, he presumes it's come out when he's brought his
16 gloves out.

17 The firefighter in question was Mr Payton. Are you
18 familiar with Mr Payton at all?

19 A. Yes, I know him.

20 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Okay. Is it possible that he
21 could have handed you that list and you just didn't
22 realise what it was?

23 A. No.

24 THE CORONER: How can you say that with confidence?

25 A. Because to my best -- best memory, nobody ever gave me

1 any -- any notes at all. Verbal communications, yes,
2 but not anything written.

3 THE CORONER: Okay, thank you.

4 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Again, it's all about a piece of
5 paper, I think. Looking at the -- having the original
6 in your hand, just sort of looking at the way the
7 information's been added to it, in that if you look at,
8 I don't know, the logical way that you use a piece of
9 paper, I guess, if you look at a list of flat numbers,
10 that I realise you say aren't in your handwriting,
11 that's fine, to us it looked as though, if you look at
12 that list of flat numbers --

13 THE CORONER: Page 180, sorry.

14 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Sorry.

15 THE CORONER: No, just so that we call it up on the screen
16 as well. Sorry, I interrupted.

17 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: That's the one, the folded piece.
18 It appeared to us as though, with those flat numbers, if
19 you were writing down those flat numbers, not you
20 personally, but someone who was writing those down, they
21 would have written it on an unfolded piece of paper,
22 just because of where the fold is, it's not symmetrical,
23 it's under the 81 rather than smack in half, if you
24 understand me.

25 A. Yes.

1 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: So I think what I'm trying to get
2 to is that you've mentioned you don't recall writing on
3 a folded sheet of paper at any time, but to us it
4 appeared that the way that the rest of the information,
5 flat numbers aside, is written on that piece of paper,
6 it only seems logical for that to have been written that
7 way if the piece of paper was already folded in half.

8 A. Yeah, I can understand why you say that. It may have
9 been, I honestly can't remember. I was just interested
10 in writing down the things that were relevant at the
11 time. I wasn't really paying attention to the way the
12 paper came up, if you know what I mean.

13 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: No, I understand. I'll just check
14 with my fellow jurors, I think that's all. Okay,
15 I think that's all, thank you.

16 Questions from THE CORONER

17 THE CORONER: Thank you very much. Mr Glenny, looking at
18 the damaged piece of paper, which I think you have with
19 you, and you've described how you were writing in
20 a difficult, damp environment and explaining how the
21 damp would have affected the paper and the writing that
22 was on it, would there have been a better way of
23 recording the information in such an environment?

24 A. In a written form, it's difficult -- there are clip
25 boards that have a kind of a hood, a plastic hood, but

1 DR OLAF BIERDRZYCKI (sworn)

2 THE CORONER: Thank you, do sit down. Do help yourself to
3 a glass of water.

4 A. Thank you.

5 THE CORONER: You have a nice loud, clear voice, but please
6 if you could keep your voice up that will help us all,
7 and the microphone will pick up your voice but you need
8 to be fairly close to.

9 A. Okay, thank you, madam.

10 THE CORONER: Mr Maxwell-Scott who is standing is going to
11 ask you questions and then there may be questions from
12 others. Thank you.

13 Questions by MR MAXWELL-SCOTT

14 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: Good afternoon, Dr Bierdrzycki, can you
15 give the court your full name, please?

16 A. Yes, that's Dr Olaf James Bierdrzycki.

17 Q. Your occupation?

18 A. I'm Home Office forensic pathologist, a member of
19 a group of partners called Forensic Pathology Services
20 that are based in Oxfordshire.

21 Q. You're here to give expert evidence to the court. Can
22 you summarise concisely for the jury your qualifications
23 and experience?

24 A. Yes. I've a Bachelor of Science in neuroscience;
25 a medical degree from University College London; I have

1 the Diploma of Medical Jurisprudence and Pathology from
2 the Society of Apothecaries of London; I'm a fellow of
3 the Royal College of Pathologists in histopathology; and
4 I am a member of the Faculty of Forensic and Legal
5 Medicine of the Royal College of Physicians.

6 Essentially, I'm engaged full time in the practice
7 of post mortem pathology. I perform numerous
8 examinations for coroners throughout London and the
9 surrounding counties and that includes performing what
10 are called routine post mortems, where the deaths are
11 not suspicious, and also what are called police forensic
12 post mortems, where the death is clearly suspicious.

13 THE CORONER: Dr Bierdrzycki, can I just say, please don't
14 speak too quickly, because the shorthand writers are
15 making a transcription and they need to be able to keep
16 up. Thank you.

17 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: You're going to be giving expert evidence
18 for us about the post mortems conducted on each of the
19 six persons who died in the Lakanal House fire?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. I think it's right that, in respect of the post mortems
22 in relation to the three children who died, they were
23 conducted by yourself but also with Dr Elena Pollina?

24 A. That's correct, yes. It's essentially Home Office
25 guidance and good practice for post mortems on children

1 in potentially suspicious circumstances to always be
2 carried out by two pathologists, one of whom would be
3 a forensic pathologist and one of whom would be
4 a dedicated paediatric pathologist.

5 Q. Thank you. With that introduction having been made,
6 what I'm going to do is take you through each of the
7 individual post mortems. I believe you have your
8 reports with you.

9 A. I do, yes.

10 Q. I'll just ask you to identify a small number of relevant
11 features, and then your conclusions.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. Firstly, the post mortem into the death of
14 Catherine Hickman. I think this was conducted on
15 7 July 2009.

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. If you have your report there, if you turn to the top of
18 the third page, there's a heading "Respiratory system".
19 Can you summarise for the jury the key findings on post
20 mortem in relation to the respiratory system?

21 A. Yes. So probably the key things to note are that the
22 tracheal lining -- the trachea is essentially the
23 windpipe that carries air from the outside to your
24 lungs, so the lining/membrane of that windpipe was
25 erythematous -- that means essentially red, engorged and

1 inflamed -- and there were thick sooty deposits reaching
2 as far as the second and third order bronchi. What that
3 means is that the windpipe, initially it goes down as
4 one pipe and then it branches into two pipes, and each
5 of those branches, branches again, and again, and again.

6 Pathologically whenever we're looking at fire
7 deaths, it's very important to look at how far soot
8 reaches into the airways, because soot just around the
9 mouth or even on the tongue could potentially be there
10 just purely by contamination from movement of the body,
11 but when you have soot well down the airways, we tend to
12 say beyond the vocal cords, which are in the sort of
13 larynx here, in this case, there was soot much further
14 than the vocal cords, there was soot within the
15 branching pattern of the airways, and this really
16 suggests that the person was alive and inhaling the fire
17 fumes as they were being produced.

18 That is also supported by the fact that the lining
19 is erythematous, in other words red, because essentially
20 these fumes are hot and they will irritate the lining of
21 the trachea and make it red and make it leak fluid,
22 essentially.

23 So the lining was red and also on squeezing the
24 lungs there was what I described as a copious amount of
25 oedema fluid. What that means is normally your lungs

1 are essentially similar to a dry sponge, there shouldn't
2 be any fluid in them, but when they become diseased or
3 unhappy, essentially, they fill up with fluid and, in
4 this case, the lungs had a lot of fluid inside them,
5 which probably represents, in part, effects of the heat
6 damage on the lung tissue. I think that summarises my
7 findings.

8 Q. Thank you. If you turn to page 4, you set out
9 a relevant finding from a separate toxicology report.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Can you just explain to us what that is?

12 A. Yes. So in any fire death, to corroborate if someone
13 was alive or not at the time that the fire was
14 happening, a test you can do is to look for something
15 called carboxyhaemoglobin. Now, normally your body has
16 a very, very minimal or no amount of carboxyhaemoglobin.
17 Carboxyhaemoglobin -- I am not sure if you've had all
18 this from the fire service --

19 Q. No, we haven't.

20 A. Okay, so carboxyhaemoglobin is essentially a compound
21 which is formed when there isn't enough air when a fire
22 is burning, so instead of forming carbon dioxide, which
23 is one carbon and two oxygens, you form carbon monoxide,
24 which is one carbon and one oxygen. Carbon monoxide,
25 the problem with that is that, essentially, the molecule

1 that takes oxygen around your body is called the heme
2 molecule, or haemoglobin.

3 If you think of that as essentially -- that has --
4 I suppose you could think of that as a ski lift taking
5 oxygen all round your body and it has four seats. The
6 carbon dioxide molecule can hitch a lift on that
7 molecule and take up one of those seats. The problem is
8 when it does that the haemoglobin molecule is not then
9 able to get rid of the oxygen and allow the oxygen to go
10 into your tissues. So essentially you die because your
11 haemoglobin molecule is not able to release the oxygen
12 to your tissues. I hope I've explained that well
13 enough.

14 We can measure whether this carbon dioxide level has
15 been elevated by trying to estimate what the
16 carboxyhaemoglobin level in the blood is. In normal
17 people, that should be very, very low, sort of 0 to
18 10 per cent. If you smoke it can be elevated to a few
19 per cent, and if you're a particularly heavy smoke of
20 a pipe or cigars it can get to maybe 5 or 7 per cent.
21 In this case it was 27 per cent, so very elevated.

22 Q. Thank you. Turning to the histopathological
23 examination, if you could first of all explain to the
24 jury what this means.

25 A. Yes, this was just essentially a confirmatory

1 examination and for proper documentary purposes that
2 I undertook this, because I could clearly see that there
3 was soot in the airways below the vocal cords with my
4 eyes, but for purposes of documentation and to be
5 absolutely sure, histopathology is where you take
6 a little section of that tissue and look at it under
7 a microscope, just to confirm what you're seeing and see
8 if there's anything else.

9 So I did take some sections from the lung and the
10 lining of the windpipe, and the sections of the lung
11 confirmed haemorrhage within the lung tissue and fluid
12 within the lung tissue, and the tracheal lining showed
13 that the lining of the windpipe had been shed and
14 copious soot deposits and areas of haemorrhage. So all
15 the things that you would expect to see when you inhale
16 hot gasses.

17 Q. If I then ask you to look at your section headed
18 "Commentary and conclusions" --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- and read out the first two, please.

21 A. I made a number of comments and conclusions at the end,
22 and I've said:

23 "The presence of soot visible below the vocal cords
24 indicates active respiration during the fire. This is
25 confirmed by the toxicology results which shows a carbon

1 monoxide level of 27 per cent. When combined with the
2 degree of" --

3 What we haven't mentioned yet is, in addition to
4 this, there was significant burning evident on this
5 body, as a mixture of partial thickness and full
6 thickness burns. I estimated it at approximately
7 76 per cent of the body's surface, so just over three
8 quarters.

9 Now, it's possible that quite a lot of that occurred
10 once the person was already deceased or certainly
11 unconscious, but it's also possible that some of it
12 occurred while the person was alive.

13 I've said that:

14 "When combined with the degree of shock due to the
15 burns [that the burns would produce], this combination
16 would easily be fatal."

17 Then I've just gone on to talk about the burns in
18 that comment.

19 My second comment was that I saw no natural disease
20 that may have caused or contributed to the death and
21 that toxicology examination has also shown that neither
22 alcohol nor common prescription drugs have played
23 a significant role in the death.

24 Finally, there were no signs of trauma, violence, or
25 that third party assault had played a role in the death,

1 and I gave the formal cause of death as inhalation of
2 fire fumes and burns.

3 Q. Causes of death are classed in a certain way, are they
4 not, and you've given it as:

5 "1A: inhalation of fire fumes and burns."

6 A. Yes, they're usually given as 1A, 1B and 1C, where if
7 you have one condition leading to another, leading to
8 another. In this case, I just thought that the direct
9 cause of death in this case was the inhalation of the
10 fire fumes and the burns.

11 Q. Thank you. Before then turning to the other post mortem
12 reports, can you confirm that none of the other five
13 people who died suffered burns to their bodies?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. If I then take you to the post mortem relating to
16 Dayana Francisquini. This was conducted on 7 July 2009.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. If you turn to page 3 of the report, there's a section
19 headed "Respiratory system". Can you summarise for us
20 again the key findings on post mortem in relation to
21 that system?

22 A. Yes, so again here, go straight to the windpipe or the
23 trachea and the bronchi, the branches of the windpipe.
24 They were lined by tiny particulate soot deposits and
25 these were seen well below the vocal cords. The

1 underlying lining was erythematous or inflamed, and on
2 squeezing there was again described as a copious amount
3 of oedema fluid.

4 Q. Turning to page 4 of the report, again there's a short
5 section headed "Histopathological examination". Did
6 that again confirm what you discovered visually, which
7 you've just described?

8 A. Confirmed what I discovered visually with very similar
9 changes to what I described to you in the previous case.

10 Q. Was there, as in the previous case, a separate
11 toxicology report?

12 A. There was.

13 Q. What was the percentage of carboxyhaemoglobin in the
14 blood?

15 A. This was 51 per cent.

16 Q. If you could tell us then the first two points in your
17 commentary and conclusions section and any others that
18 you consider particularly significant.

19 A. So again I then made a number of comments at the end of
20 the report. Number 1, the presence of soot visible
21 below the vocal cords indicates active respiration
22 during the fire. This is supported by the toxicology
23 result, which shows a carbon monoxide level of 51
24 per cent. No natural disease that may have caused or
25 contributed to the death. Toxicology has shown that

1 neither alcohol nor common prescription drugs have
2 played any significant role in the death. Again, no
3 significant trauma, violence or third party assault
4 played a role in the death.

5 Q. What did you give as the formal cause of death?

6 A. Inhalation of fire fumes.

7 Q. Thank you. Then if you turn next to the post mortem
8 report relating to Felipe Francisquini Cervi. This post
9 mortem was conducted with Dr Pollina on 6 July 2009,
10 I believe.

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. If you turn in the documents that we have, your report
13 has comments and conclusions on page 2. If you could
14 tell us what they are.

15 A. Yes, essentially no significant signs of trauma or
16 violence on the body, no burns internally. Soot
17 deposits were seen in the trachea beyond the vocal
18 cords, indicating life and active respiration during the
19 time of the fire, and this is supported by toxicological
20 results which indicate that blood carbon dioxide level
21 of 23.8 per cent.

22 Q. As before, you've taken that from a separate toxicology
23 report.

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. You refer to a separate report by Dr Pollina that we'll

1 look at briefly in a moment, but what did you give as
2 the formal cause of death?

3 A. Inhalation of fire fumes.

4 Q. If you turn on then to the beginning of Dr Pollina's
5 report, and then turn within the report to page 4 of it,
6 which deals with the respiratory system and identify for
7 us the key features set out there.

8 A. Yes, so she says respiratory system: nasal cavities,
9 larynx, trachea and main bronchi, containing large
10 amounts of soot; hyperaemic -- that's another way of
11 what I've been saying -- erythematous, in other words
12 inflamed. She then just describes that they have
13 a normal anatomy.

14 Essentially, the big purpose of having two doctors
15 doing examinations where children, especially babies,
16 are involved, is that the pathology can be very, very
17 different in babies, especially babies, and very young
18 children, and it would be outside my area of expertise
19 to fully exclude all manner of natural disease that
20 a baby or a young child may have. So the main point of
21 having Dr Pollina here was that I'm an expert in trauma
22 pathology, she's an expert in natural disease pathology
23 in young children. It was to fully exclude the presence
24 of any natural disease in the child deaths.

25 Q. If you turn to the fifth page of her report and the

1 section headed "Histology", are there any points in that
2 that you want to draw specifically to our attention?

3 A. Just that she confirmed similar changes that I had seen
4 in my own histology taken from the adult cases. She
5 describes the larynx, the trachea, the bronchi and the
6 lungs. She says they have a normal structure. She says
7 there's sloughing and coagulative necrosis of the
8 trachael epithelium. In other words, the lining of the
9 windpipe is dying, essentially. There's congestion and
10 multiple foci of fresh intra-alveolar haemorrhage, in
11 other words she's saying that blood cells have leaked
12 into the actual lung tissue. Pockets of lung tissue
13 where air should be are now full of blood, as probably
14 a result of heat damage. She also confirms oedema and
15 inhaled soot.

16 Q. For the record, am I right in saying that both she and
17 you agreed on the cause of death as inhalation of fire
18 fumes?

19 A. Yes, the cause of death was agreed for all the cases by
20 both of us, and I believe in addition a third post
21 mortem was carried out by a further person independently
22 who also has confirmed the findings.

23 Q. Thank you. Then if I ask you to turn to the report of
24 the post mortem in relation to Thais Francisquini. This
25 was on 7 July 2009 and was this also conducted with

1 Dr Pollina.

2 A. Yes, this was, yes.

3 Q. If you turn to the second page of your report, you set
4 out the finding from the separate toxicology report --

5 A. The carboxyhaemoglobin level in this case was
6 71 per cent.

7 Q. Thank you. You told us already there would have been no
8 burns on the body.

9 A. No.

10 Q. What were the agreed key findings in relation to the
11 respiratory system?

12 A. Again, there was soot visible below the vocal cords,
13 indicating active respiration during the fire.

14 Q. And pulmonary oedema?

15 A. Yes, there was pulmonary oedema in all the cases, yes.

16 Q. Thank you. What were your conclusions?

17 A. The conclusion again was that the cause of death was
18 inhalation of fire fumes.

19 Q. Thank you. Then if you take the report of the post
20 mortem examination relating to Helen Udoaka, this is
21 an examination on 7 July 2009. If you turn to page 2 of
22 it and again tell the members of the jury your key
23 findings on examination in relation to the respiratory
24 system.

25 A. Yes, so again I've noted that the windpipe lining was

1 red or erythematous, as was the epiglottis which is the
2 flap of cartilage which comes across the top of the
3 windpipe to prevent food going down your windpipe when
4 you swallow, to make sure the food goes down the
5 oesophagus. So that was erythematous as well.

6 Again, soot deposits could be seen past the tracheal
7 bifurcation, so that's where the main windpipe divides
8 in two, one pipe to the right lung, one pipe to the left
9 lung, and more soot was seen in these main bronchi, or
10 the main pipes to each lung.

11 The upper airways also contained a quantity of
12 frothy pink secretions, and in this case there was only
13 a mild amount of oedema fluid, but nevertheless there
14 was some.

15 Q. Thank you. Then on page 3 you set out the report from
16 the separate toxicology report. You set out the
17 finding, 49 per cent in this case --

18 A. Carboxyhaemoglobin of 49 per cent, yes.

19 Q. Thank you. Did the histopathological examination
20 confirm what you've already described to the jury?

21 A. Yes, again, the examination of the lungs down the
22 microscope confirmed fluid, haemorrhage into the air
23 sacks of the lung, where there should be air there was
24 blood. Again sloughing of the lining of the trachea and
25 admix soot particles and areas of bleeding below the

1 main lining of the trachea.

2 Again, all features of inhalation of fire fumes
3 which would be hot.

4 Q. Then if you tell the jury your conclusions, please.

5 A. So the conclusions are that again soot visible below the
6 vocal cords indicating active respiration during the
7 fire, the carboxyhaemoglobin level of 49 per cent
8 confirming that; no natural disease that may have caused
9 or contributed to the death; toxicology showing that
10 neither alcohol nor common prescription drugs had played
11 a role in the death; and no signs of trauma, violence or
12 third party assault played a role in the death.

13 Q. What did you give us as the formal cause of death?

14 A. Inhalation of fire fumes.

15 Q. Thank you. Then if you turn to the report for the post
16 mortem examination in relation to Michelle Udoaka, this
17 was on 6 July 2009, and is it right this was again
18 conducted jointly with Dr Pollina?

19 A. Yes, this was a relatively new born baby, so this was
20 conducted with Dr Pollina.

21 Q. What were the key findings in relation to the
22 respiratory system?

23 A. Again, soot deposits were seen in the trachea beyond the
24 vocal cords, indicating life and active respiration and
25 the carboxyhaemoglobin level was 41 per cent, again

1 supporting the finding that the baby was alive at the
2 time of the fire.

3 Q. What were the conclusions?

4 A. Again, Dr Pollina performed a concise post mortem into
5 the internal organs, excluding the presence of natural
6 disease contributing and the conclusions were that the
7 cause of death was inhalation of fire fumes.

8 Q. By way of summary, can you confirm that all six cases
9 had markedly raised carboxyhaemoglobin levels, the
10 lowest of which was 23.8 per cent --

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. -- in all six cases, there was a finding on post mortem
13 of pulmonary oedema --

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. -- and in all six cases a finding of soot in the
16 airways?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Thank you very much, I have no further questions, but
19 others may have some questions.

20 THE CORONER: Thank you. Any questions?

21 MS AL TAI: I just have one brief question, madam.

22 THE CORONER: Yes, Ms Al Tai.

23 Questions by MS AL TAI

24 MS AL TAI: Good afternoon, Mr Bierdrzycki. I act on behalf
25 of Mark Bailey, Catherine Hickman's partner. Just

1 briefly, please, if we could go to the last page of the
2 report.

3 A. Sorry, I didn't get the name of the report you're
4 referring to.

5 Q. Sorry, this is Miss Hickman's report, and it's the last
6 page of the report, please, and it anticipates the
7 section identified as "Commentary and conclusions". You
8 briefly touched upon it earlier, and it's really you
9 were talking about the total estimated body surface
10 which had been burned.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. I just wanted to ask you in respect, you said that
13 whilst some of the burning had been conducted post
14 mortem, there was evidence of vital reaction in some of
15 the areas.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Can you just explain briefly when you mean by that?

18 A. Yes, once you have third degree burns, it's very
19 difficult to know if that happened pre or post mortem.
20 If the burns are partial thickness, you tend to get
21 a sort of -- again, "erythematous" is a word that I'll
22 use again, in other words a reddening effect,
23 delineating the area of the burn, and there was some
24 evidence to some of the burns that that had occurred.

25 So that tends to suggest -- that doesn't happen if

1 A. Yes.

2 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Could you give us a realistic
3 level of carboxy that's (a) survivable and also is there
4 a certain saturation point at which somebody is past
5 saving, for want of a better word?

6 THE CORONER: Members of the jury, I think on Monday we're
7 going to have evidence from an expert, from a consultant
8 in this area of medicine, and so I think that it's going
9 to be more appropriate to hear his evidence and then
10 deal with any questions after that.

11 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Okay, thank you.

12 A. I can say, madam, that the fatal level can vary very
13 much depending on a number of things. These are all
14 healthy people with no natural disease. The typical
15 stated fatal level of carboxyhaemoglobin level is
16 50 per cent, but that's in a situation where you may
17 just be inhaling that gas alone. In a dynamic situation
18 as this, you have other effects playing out, you have
19 other gasses and other toxic substances in there, such
20 as cyanide, which may be present, you have the damage to
21 the airways, which may be slightly variable in the
22 different cases --

23 THE CORONER: Dr Bierdrzycki, can I just stop you there,
24 thank you very much for, as it were setting the scene
25 for us, but Professor Bion is coming on Monday and

1 I think we'll be able to deal with this in some detail.

2 A. Yes, there is a report that you'll hear next which goes
3 into that in a lot of detail.

4 THE FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Thank you.

5 THE CORONER: All right. Dr Bierdrzycki, thank you very
6 much for coming and thank you very much for the help
7 that you've been able to give us.

8 A. Thank you.

9 THE CORONER: You're welcome to stay, but you're free to go
10 if you would prefer, thank you.

11 (The witness withdrew)

12 THE CORONER: Yes, thank you.

13 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: Madam, Dr Bierdrzycki was the final
14 witness today, but I have four statements to read.

15 THE CORONER: Yes, thank you.

16 Witness statement of JAMES DAVISON (read)

17 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: The first statement I don't have
18 electronically, so I won't be able to put it on the
19 screens. It's a statement from James Davison, and it's
20 dated today's date, 8 February 2013, and it reads as
21 follows:

22 "I am employed by Hutchison 3G UK Limited, trading
23 as 3, and have been since July 2007. I am familiar with
24 3's customer records, some of which are held on computer
25 and I am competent to retrieve such information and

1 produce it as evidence. I've been asked by the
2 Metropolitan Police to provide evidence and information
3 relating to mobile telephone numbers ..."

4 He gives two numbers:

5 "... both of which are Hutchison 3G telephone
6 numbers.

7 "The subscriber details for [the first number],
8 specify it as a post pay account registered to
9 Mr Rafael Cervi, flat 81, Sceaux Gardens, Lakanal House,
10 London SE5 7DP. The subscriber details for [the second
11 number] specify it as a post pay account registered to
12 Mr Mbet Udoaka, flat 82, Sceaux Gardens, Lakanal House,
13 London SE5 7DP.

14 "During 2009, at the request of the Metropolitan
15 Police I produced from our records incoming and outgoing
16 phone call data for 3 July 2009 in respect of the
17 aforementioned phone numbers. I've been invited to
18 comment on the data so as to assist the inquest, but in
19 doing so it should be noted that Hutchison 3G are
20 entirely separate from the overall investigation into
21 the events at Lakanal on 3 July and are not familiar
22 with the other evidence in this case.

23 "The following refers to descriptions of terms
24 relevant to the call data. The first is outgoing
25 data/incoming data. These terms are self-explanatory in

1 that they differentiate between calls and messages sent
2 to or from the above phone numbers. In common with the
3 other networks, Hutchison 3G consider that incoming data
4 may not be as accurate as outgoing data, because it
5 includes calls and messages originating from other
6 networks as opposed to outgoing data, which originates
7 from Hutchinson 3G.

8 " 'Mobile originated' appears in the outgoing data
9 and means that an outgoing phone call has been made and
10 has successfully connected with the network, and
11 a destination number in some capacity. This may mean
12 that, even if the call is successful, it could have been
13 connected to a voicemail service.

14 " 'Mobile terminated' appears in the incoming data,
15 and is only displayed when an incoming call is answered,
16 therefore incoming calls going to voicemail will not be
17 displayed as 'mobile terminated' and may not even appear
18 in the call data.

19 " If a voicemail was left then the network will
20 automatically attempt to send a voicemail alert text
21 message after the call has been made, although it should
22 be noted that it may not be delivered in every instance.
23 This can be due to network problems, for example the
24 short message service centre could have capacity
25 problems or the network may try to send the text but the

1 recipient's phone is not able to receive the text.

2 "When viewing the call data in this case, it is
3 possible to differentiate between voicemail alert text
4 messages and other text messages because the former are
5 identifiable by a series of numbers and letters (ending
6 169) in an accompanying column headed 'Calling ISDN'.

7 "'SMS originating' appears in the outgoing data, and
8 means that an outgoing SMS or text has been sent from
9 the originating number and has been delivered to a SMS
10 platform where it will attempt to deliver the message to
11 the intended recipient.

12 "'SMS terminating' appears in the incoming data.
13 SMS (short message service) commonly refers to a text
14 message. 'SMS terminating' means that an incoming SMS
15 or text, including voicemail alerts referred to above,
16 has been successfully delivered from the originating
17 number to the intended recipient's number, but does not
18 indicate whether or not the message was read.

19 "'Unsuccessful call attempt' appears in both the
20 incoming and outgoing data. The term itself is
21 self-explanatory in that it refers to calls that were
22 not received by the intended recipient or which were
23 received but were not answered.

24 "However, the precise reasons for this are varied
25 and can differ from call to call, but in summary the

1 main problem categories are: (1) the phone is out of
2 coverage area; (2) network issues; (3) circumstances
3 involving the calling number or dialled number (this
4 would include calls that connected and rang but were not
5 answered).

6 "The potential scenarios within the above areas are
7 wide-ranging and extensive. However, with reference to
8 the call data in this case, it can be seen that both
9 phone numbers made and received numerous successful
10 calls during the afternoon of 3 July 2009 prior to the
11 last recorded calls.

12 "The last recorded calls were as follows. In
13 examining the outgoing call data for [the number that
14 relates to Dayana Francisquini] the last outgoing call
15 displaying 'mobile originated' was timed at 17.28.23.
16 In examining the incoming call data for the same number,
17 the last incoming call displaying 'mobile terminated'
18 was 17.38.28. According to the available data, there
19 were no further outgoing or incoming calls after these
20 times, other than an incoming unsuccessful call attempt
21 at 18.43.58.

22 "In examining the outgoing call data for (the number
23 of Helen Udoaka) the last outgoing call displaying
24 'mobile originated' was timed at 17.15.17. In examining
25 the incoming call data for the same number, the last

1 incoming call displaying 'mobile terminated' was
2 17.43.56. According to the available data, there were
3 no further outgoing or incoming calls after these times,
4 other than eight incoming unsuccessful call attempts and
5 two incoming SMS terminating, both voicemail alerts,
6 timed between 17.45.08 and 20.05.12."

7 Then a new heading:

8 "First minute billing.

9 "It should be noted that this term is only relevant
10 to customer billing which is separate from
11 incoming/outgoing call data that I refer to in this
12 statement. However, by way of explanation, Hutchison 3G
13 use a system called first minute billing, meaning that
14 if a customer makes a call that lasts anything up to
15 a minute, they will still be charged for a minute, but
16 anything over a minute will show the exact duration in
17 minutes and seconds.

18 "The information to which I refer forms part of the
19 records relating to the account holder which were
20 compiled in the normal course of the company's business
21 by persons acting under a duty, from information
22 supplied by a person, whether acting under a duty or
23 not, who have or are reasonably supposed to have
24 personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in that
25 information and cannot reasonably be expected (having

1 regard to the time which has elapsed since he/she
2 supplied or required the information and to all the
3 circumstances) to have any recollection of the matters
4 dealt with in that information.

5 "I have made disclosure of this information pursuant
6 to a request by the police under section 22(4) of the
7 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000."

8 That's the end of the statement.

9 THE CORONER: Thank you. Members of the jury, that's quite
10 a difficult document to take in just listening to it
11 orally, which is no criticism of Mr Maxwell-Scott's
12 reading of it, it's just that it's closely written and
13 quite complex. I wonder whether we might suggest two
14 things. On the last page, Mr Maxwell-Scott, we have the
15 information which is given as to last outgoing call and
16 last incoming calls and so on referred to in relation to
17 both Dayana Francisquini and Helen Udoaka, and I wonder
18 whether perhaps the information from this statement
19 might be added to the sequence of events. I don't know
20 whether that's --

21 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: I think some of it will be in there
22 already.

23 THE CORONER: Yes, I haven't cross checked, so I may be
24 doing you a disservice, it may already be there, but we
25 could have a look and make sure that it all has been

1 captured.

2 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: The 17.38 and 17.43 will be in there
3 already.

4 THE CORONER: Those are actually in there already, all
5 right.

6 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: We'll have a look at the others.

7 THE CORONER: Okay. I wonder whether perhaps we might just
8 redact the phone numbers and give the members of the
9 jury a copy of this statement, then if they want to make
10 reference to it to pick up any detail they can do so.

11 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: Certainly.

12 THE CORONER: All right, that would be helpful, unless
13 anyone has any objection to that? Thank you very much.
14 That will help.

15 Witness statement of BRIAN HAYES (read)

16 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: I'll then read the statement of
17 Brian James Hayes. This is at page 21 of the bundle of
18 statements to be read under rule 37, and I'll put it up
19 on the screen.

20 THE CORONER: Thank you.

21 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: The statement is dated 25 August 2009,
22 and it says:

23 "I am Brian Hayes and I am a paramedic team leader
24 with the London Ambulance Service. I've been employed
25 by the LAS for eight year, and a team leader for the

1 last 12 months. I am anticipate based at Waterloo
2 Ambulance Station, Frazier Street, SE1. I am
3 operational and responsible for clinical practice and
4 supervisor for approximately 20 paramedics and
5 technicians.

6 "During this statement, I will refer to patient
7 report forms completed at the time of incidents,
8 exhibited as (BJH/1, 2, 3). On Friday, 3 July 2009,
9 I was on duty starting at 0700 hours and scheduled to do
10 team leader duty and not on a vehicle until 1900 hours.

11 "I was aware at about 1650 hours that an incident
12 was occurring in Camberwell. I was aware that there was
13 a fire with persons reported in a fire, potentially
14 there could be a number of casualties. I prepared the
15 patient transport vehicle and put on more equipment for
16 burns patients and oxygen for smoke inhalation.
17 Together with two LAS staff, a paramedic and
18 a technician, we went in the PTV to Lakanal House,
19 Havil Street in Camberwell. We arrived at the scene at
20 about 17.30 hours. On our arrival I saw a block of
21 flats. Two of the levels next to each other toward the
22 top of the building had smoke billowing from windows,
23 and occasionally I could see flame. One of the lower
24 levels also had smoke coming out from windows. I also
25 noticed a lot of debris on the floor, broken glass,

1 window frames, et cetera. We parked very close to the
2 scene, and took the call sign N375. My colleagues were
3 Lesley Palmer and Peter Wetheridge.

4 "During this statement I will also refer to an LAS
5 document called appendix H, police statement file M09/01
6 (section 1), which refers to a brief overview, a map of
7 the area, an LAS staff log and a complete patient log of
8 patients LAS staff dealt with (BJH/4).

9 "On arrival and a short while later we were
10 approached by a black male carrying in his arms two
11 children who were his daughters. They were Yasmin Nuhu,
12 aged one years, and Marian Nuhu, aged three years, both
13 flat 80. They were suffering from smoke inhalation. We
14 gave both children oxygen therapy and the decision was
15 to take both children to hospital. So we put in a blue
16 call (alert to hospital). We left the scene at 17.46
17 and arrived at King's College Hospital, Camberwell, at
18 1755 hours. Both children were taken to the resus
19 together with their father and handed over to hospital
20 staff."

21 Then he refers to the patient reports for each of
22 them:

23 "We then returned to the scene in the same vehicle
24 with my two colleagues. On arrival I was asked to crew
25 up with vehicle call sign F102 together with the crew,

1 who were both technicians. We had been given
2 notification that patients in cardiac arrest were being
3 brought from the building. We called forward in our
4 ambulance to the forward triage point. On our arrival
5 at the forward triage point, I noticed immediately that
6 there were three patients being given CPR by LAS staff.
7 I took over performing CPR to a young male (patient
8 report form unknown male BJH/3). The patient had
9 already been intubated (tube into airway) and inarossus
10 (needle into the bone of the shin when IV access can't
11 be obtained). Together with the crew of F103
12 Victoria Platt and Lee Stevenson, we left the scene at
13 1844 together with our patient. Lee Stevenson drove the
14 vehicle to KCH whilst Victoria Platt and myself
15 continued CPR. We arrived at KCH at 1850 hours and were
16 met at the ambulance bay by hospital staff and the
17 patient was taken straight to resus and handed over to
18 a doctor. On handover the patient had no apparent signs
19 of life. We all then returned to the scene. On our
20 arrival, I took responsibility for setting up three
21 trolley beds in an area close by should further patient
22 be brought out. No further patients requiring trolley
23 beds were brought out. A number of people were removed
24 from the building suffering from mild smoke inhalation,
25 but I didn't deal with these individuals.

1 "We were stood by for some time at the scene and
2 were involved at an on scene hot debrief. I returned to
3 Waterloo depot at about 0700 hours the next morning."

4 That's the end of the statement.

5 Witness statement of VICTOR BROOKER (read)

6 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: I will then read the statement of Victor
7 James Brooker, which starts at page 24 of the same
8 bundle. This statement is dated 19 August 2009 and
9 reads as follows:

10 "I had currently employed by the London Ambulance
11 Service as a paramedic on the HART (hazardous area
12 response team) team. I have been on the HART team since
13 March 2009. I have been a paramedic since 2005 and
14 I have been employed by the LAS since 2001. I am
15 currently based at Deptford Ambulance Station.

16 "On Friday 3 July 2009 I was working a 0700 to 1900
17 shift. I was crewing a heavy equipment vehicle with
18 Robbie Hickling, our call sign was 1A32. I am making
19 this statement purely from memory without reference to
20 our CAD or the HART team log so any times I give will be
21 estimates.

22 "Some time after 1600 we were called to attend
23 Lakanal House in Camberwell, where there was a fire in
24 progress. We made our way to the address from Old Kent
25 Road, arriving not long after we had received the call.

1 "We pulled up in Havil Street, just north of the
2 junction with Dalwood Road, and walked towards
3 Lakanal House. As we walked towards Lakanal House, we
4 saw that on the west side there were multiple fires on
5 various floors.

6 "We found Tony Parnell, our supervisor, and
7 Colin Pinnington, another member of our team, stood on
8 the grass opposite the west side of the building. There
9 were firefighters who were actively fighting the fire on
10 the west side of the building between the building and
11 our position. We briefly spoke to Tony and Colin and
12 were told to go to the truck and get our kits on. We
13 went back to the truck and kitted up. Our kits are
14 extended duration breathing apparatus.

15 "We then went back to the green on the west side and
16 awaited direction from Colin who was liaising with LFB
17 officers.

18 "We were awaiting direction for a while and while
19 waiting we heard reports that there were people out on
20 their balconies on the east side of the building.

21 "At around this time we observed firefighters bump
22 cars out of the way on Dalwood Road so that they could
23 move a turntable ladder appliance to the east side of
24 the building. While doing this they tipped one car over
25 onto its side.

1 "At our initial casualty treatment area on Dalwood
2 Road to the east of the block, we quickly showed LAS
3 staff how to use our RAD57 equipment that measures
4 carbon monoxide levels, before we were sent to the east
5 side of the building.

6 On the east side of the building, we awaited
7 deployment at the LFB BA entry control area. After
8 waiting for a period of time, we were briefed by
9 a firefighter (I don't know who he was, or what rank he
10 was). He told us that we were going to enter with
11 firefighters. I think they were the FRU crew who were
12 wearing EDDBA. He stated this was search and rescue for
13 the occupants of flat 81 on the 11th floor.

14 "I think there were four members of the EDDBA crew
15 from the LFB. They went in with myself, Robbie Hickling
16 and Shaun Rock. Shaun is trained to use EDDBA and had
17 kitted up and joined us to go into the building.

18 "We handed in our tallies to go on the BA entry
19 control board and then walked up to the 11th floor.

20 "On the way up we passed a firefighter who was
21 taking a female out.

22 "Our EDDBA kits are equipped with a radio so we had
23 constant contact with Colin Pinnington who was outside
24 the building. When we got up to the 11th floor it was
25 hot and smoke-logged in the stairwell.

1 "There was already a charged hose running up the
2 stairs from a lower floor. It went through a double
3 door to the right of the stairs.

4 "The firefighters went in through that door while we
5 waited next to the stairs to conserve oxygen. I wasn't
6 able to see what was behind the doors on the right-hand
7 side.

8 "One of the firefighters came back out and told us
9 there was a severe fire that they were actively fighting
10 and they were unable to get to flat 81.

11 "We assisted that firefighter carry some hose up
12 onto the 11th floor. We maintained regular contact
13 between ourselves, Colin via the radio, and the
14 firefighters.

15 "We spent a while waiting there, making regular
16 gauge checks. We also opened up the doors to the left
17 of the stairwell to try and release some of the smoke.

18 "We decided that when our cylinders reached 100-bar
19 pressure we would leave.

20 "The fire crew we had gone up with let us know they
21 were running low on air and were leaving, but there was
22 a relief crew on its way up.

23 "The relief crew arrived a short while later and
24 went through the doors to the right of the stairwell.

25 "I would estimate we'd been on the 11th floor for

1 30 minutes when the LFB began to present up with
2 patients.

3 "A firefighter came out carrying a baby. Shaun Rock
4 took it from him and began conveying it downstairs.

5 "A short while later an adult female was brought
6 out. She was white, about 30 years old.

7 "She was followed seconds later by a young child.
8 He was white about five years old. Neither of them
9 appeared obviously dead at first. They were both in
10 cardiac arrest but didn't appear cyanosed. I checked
11 the adult female and Robbie checked the child. The
12 female had no pulse. I carried out a round of
13 compressions on her.

14 "The fire crew told us that they were low on air and
15 needed to go out.

16 "Robbie was carrying out basic support to the child
17 and had removed his BA mask to perform mouth to mouth.

18 "The decision was made to leave. The decision was
19 made to leave the adult female on the landing.
20 I recognised life extinct.

21 "We relayed the information to Colin.

22 "A firefighter picked up the child to carry it down.
23 Robbie carried the child's head, performing basic life
24 support, either as they went, or stopping on the
25 landings to do so.

1 "We went straight outside after reaching the ground
2 floor.

3 "Sean was outside working on the baby and Robbie was
4 working on the child.

5 "Tony Parnell and one of the firefighters helped me
6 take off my BA and I got some oxygen for Robbie who had
7 intubated the child.

8 "I tried to cannulate the child's arm but couldn't
9 find a vein. One of the doctors at the scene put
10 an intra osseous needle into the child's leg.

11 "Shaun went off with the baby and the child was put
12 on a bed and handed over to someone and conveyed away.

13 "Following this, I began to put our kits together,
14 storing them to the side of the triage area at the east
15 side of the building.

16 "At one point a firefighter was carried out of the
17 building by his colleagues and Robbie assisted with
18 treatment of him. He was hyperventilating and needed to
19 be cooled down. He was conveyed away by an ambulance
20 crew. I sorted out our kits and began testing them and
21 getting new cylinders from the back. I was still doing
22 this when the night tour HART team turned up and said
23 they'd take over.

24 "We left then with the kits and the keys to the
25 truck had already been passed over. I got changed back

1 at the truck and then used their transporter vehicle to
2 go back to Deptford where we conducted a hot debrief.

3 "I got off duty at around 2215.

4 "I remember at some point during the incident there
5 was a black male stood on one of the upper floors of the
6 building on the east side of the building tying sheets
7 together, as if to fashion a rope and climb down.
8 I think this was prior to us going in. There were a lot
9 of people stood around shouting at him not to do it and
10 to go back inside.

11 "I think this happened prior to us entering the
12 building."

13 That's the end of the statement.

14 THE CORONER: Thank you.

15 Witness statement of ABHIMAUNU LALL (read)

16 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: Finally, I will read a one page statement
17 from Abhimaunu Lall, which is at page 103 of the bundle
18 of statements to be read. The statement is from
19 Dr Lall, a consultant neonatologist. It's headed "Re
20 Michelle Udoaka, date of birth 13 June 2009, date of
21 death 3 July 2009". The statement is dated
22 26 March 2010 and reads as follows:

23 "I was the consultant in attendance at the
24 resuscitation when baby Michelle Udoaka was admitted to
25 Accident and Emergency, King's College Hospital on

1 3 July 2009 at 1907.

2 "Michelle appeared to be a well grown female infant
3 and was covered in a soot like substance, having been in
4 a house fire.

5 "On arrival at 19.07 Michelle had no signs of life.
6 She was reintubated with a size 3.5-millimetre
7 endotracheal tube, and this resulted in good chest wall
8 movement on positive pressure ventilation in oxygen.
9 Cardiac compressions were continued and an intravenous
10 cannula was sited. Intravenous doses of adrenalin,
11 sodium bicarbonate, normal saline and 10 per cent
12 dextrose were given. A venous blood gas at 19.10
13 revealed a pH of 6.5 with a base excess of minus
14 35mmol/l and lactate of 22mol/l. At 19.16 there were
15 still no signs of life and resuscitation was
16 discontinued after discussion with Michelle's father."

17 That's the end of the statement.

18 THE CORONER: Thank you very much. Thank you for reading
19 those, Mr Maxwell-Scott, thank you.

20 Yes, that's the end of the evidence for the members
21 of the jury today, thank you very much. Could we
22 perhaps just have a quick preview for next week so the
23 jurors know what we're going to be looking at?

24 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: Yes, certainly. On Monday morning, we
25 will hear firstly from Professor Julian Bion, who's

1 an expert witness in intensive care medicine. After
2 that, also on Monday, we will hear from the two crew
3 members of command unit 4, firstly Watch Manager
4 Derryck Best and, secondly, Watch Manager Martin Cook.
5 On Tuesday, we will hear from Watch Manager
6 Andrew Paffett from command unit 2 and we will hear from
7 Harry Simmons, who was operations manager in brigade
8 control. We will hear from further members of the LFB
9 on Wednesday and Thursday and possibly also on Friday,
10 depending on the progress that's made.

11 THE CORONER: Thank you very much, Mr Maxwell-Scott.
12 Members of the jury, thank you once again for such close
13 attention and concentration during this week. Do you
14 remember on the first day that I made it clear that it's
15 really important that the evidence that you hear in this
16 room is the only evidence which you should be taking
17 into account, and what we want you to do is to form
18 a view only when you all discuss matters together, and
19 only taking into account the evidence that you hear in
20 this room, which is why I keep giving you the reminders
21 that it is important that you don't talk to anyone at
22 all about the case and you don't carry out any private
23 research.

24 So if I just leave you with that thought over the
25 weekend, and we'll see you on Monday for a 10 o'clock

1 start. Thank you very much.

2 Mr Clark, is that page of manuscript notes -- is
3 that -- ah, you have it there.

4 (In the absence of the Jury)

5 THE CORONER: Yes, thank you very much all of you for your
6 help this week. Are there any perceived problems with
7 this coming week or with any matters?

8 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: There aren't, madam. It's possible that
9 we might complete all the evidence scheduled for next
10 week by the end of Thursday, and if we were to do that
11 then I would suggest having a reading day on the Friday
12 and starting David Crowder's evidence as scheduled on
13 Monday, 18 February.

14 THE CORONER: I think probably everybody would welcome that
15 opportunity, so we'll just keep our fingers crossed that
16 we can otherwise keep up with the timetable.

17 MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: On that point, I'll say it now, I'll send
18 it round by email as well, but I will propose for
19 people's consideration reading the witness statement of
20 Group Manager Mark Andrews rather than calling him.
21 He's currently listed next Thursday, 14 February.

22 THE CORONER: All right, it would be helpful if everybody
23 could give some thought to that and let Mr Maxwell-Scott
24 know what views they have.

25 Yes, longer term, does anyone have any concerns with

1 proposed timetable or evidence? All right, thank you
2 very much.

3 I haven't heard from anybody that anyone wants to
4 add evidence to what is planned, and according to the
5 timetable that's been sent round and is now being
6 updated. Is anyone looking to ask me to include
7 evidence that isn't already identified? All right.

8 MR WALSH: I'd better say this: I don't think it's evidence
9 that isn't already identified, but it's obviously
10 planned from the fire authority's point of view, that
11 evidence will be served relatively soon to deal with
12 issues which have arisen from very senior members of the
13 fire service which are already in the timetable.

14 THE CORONER: That's very delphic. Can you help a bit more?

15 MR WALSH: Well it would be intended that there would be
16 an overarching report from -- for example, madam, you
17 can see that the commissioner of the fire authority is
18 in the list to be heard relatively late in the
19 proceedings, and for the benefit of all it is thought
20 appropriate to include a statement so that one has
21 an idea of what he's going to say. But it's not going
22 to be the introduction of new evidence, it's to deal
23 with matters in relation to that which has been heard
24 already.

25 THE CORONER: All right, that's helpful. Can you give us

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DAY 19 OF TRANSCRIPTION OF THE
Lakana1 House Fire
Inquest (CORRECTED) 08/02/2013.